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BUSINESS COURTS AND INTERSTATE COMPETITION
JOHN F. COYLE*
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, specialized trial courts that hear
business disputes primarily or exclusively have been established in
nineteen states. To explain the recent surge of interest in these courts,
policymakers and scholars alike have cited the process of interstate
competition. Specifically, these commentators have argued that busi-
ness courts serve, among other purposes, to attract out-of-state com-
panies to expand their business, reincorporate, or litigate disputes in
the jurisdiction that created the business court.
This Article critically evaluates each of these theories. It argues
first that business courts do not serve to attract companies from other
states because business expansion decisions in the United States are
rarely driven by the high quality of the courts in a particular juris-
diction. It next argues that business courts are unlikely to attract
incorporation business because their core attributes are such that
they are unlikely to compete successfully with the Delaware Court of
Chancery. The Article goes on to argue that while the creation of a
business court may in some cases serve to divert litigation business
to local lawyers, the opportunities for diversion are relatively limited. 
The Article then draws upon these insights to offer a number of
suggestions as to how future business courts should be designed. It
suggests that states seeking to attract technology companies should
think twice before creating a business and technology court. It notes
that major institutional reforms will be required if states wish to
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use business courts to attract incorporation business away from
Delaware. It also identifies additional steps that states might take to
more effectively attract litigation business. The Article concludes by
evaluating the viability of several non-competition-based rationales
for establishing business courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, specialized trial courts with dockets
comprised primarily or exclusively of business cases—commonly
known as business courts—have been established in nineteen states
in the United States. In 1993, business courts were established in
New York and Illinois.1 In the years to follow, business courts were
created in North Carolina (1995), New Jersey (1996), Pennsylvania
(2000), Massachusetts (2000), Nevada (2000), Rhode Island (2001),
Maryland (2003), Florida (2004), Georgia (2005), Oregon (2006),
Colorado (2006), South Carolina (2007), Maine (2008), New
Hampshire (2008), Alabama (2009), Ohio (2009), and Delaware
(2010).2 There are today in the United States more trial courts that
hear business disputes primarily or exclusively than at any previous
moment in the nation’s history.
In seeking to explain the rise of the business court, policymakers
and legal scholars alike have cited the process of interstate com-
petition.3 Some commentators have argued that a business court
1. Anne Tucker Nees, Making a Case for Business Courts: A Survey of and Proposed
Framework to Evaluate Business Courts, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 477, 481, 505 tbl.1 (2007).
2. Id. at 505-09 tbl.1 (Illinois, New York, North Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, Maryland, Florida, Georgia, and Oregon);
Memorandum from Gilbert A. Martinez, Chief Judge, Fourth Judicial Dist. of Co. (Nov. 21,
2006), available at http://www.gofourth.org/CJD%20Comm%20docketfourth_judicial_district
.htm (Colorado); Lee Applebaum, The Steady Growth of Business Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends/home/
Specialized-Courts-Services/3-3-The-Steady-Growth-of-Business-Courts.aspx (last visited
Mar. 28, 2012) (South Carolina, New Hampshire, Alabama, Ohio, and Delaware); Journal of
Bus. & Tech. Law, Overview of State Business, Technology and Complex Courts/Programs,
U. MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L., http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/jbtl/
bus_tech_res.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (Maine).
3. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts
in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1995) (“If states are ... choosing
to establish specialized corporate and commercial courts as a means for attracting commerce,
or in-state incorporations, or business for the bar, then the dynamics of the competition
among states for these benefits will affect substance and procedure also.”); Diane P. Wood,
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Generalist Judges in a
Specialized World, Speech at the SMU School of Law Eighth Annual Judge Irving L. Goldberg
Lecture Series (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755, 1763 (1997) (invoking business
courts as an example of “an interesting competition among court systems”). Other rationales
have also been cited to justify the creation of these courts. These include the argument that
business courts improve the quality of decisions in business cases and the claim that such
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serves to attract out-of-state businesses to a state or, alternatively,
to dissuade in-state businesses from moving elsewhere, thereby
growing the state’s economy.4 Others have suggested that a business
court attracts out-of-state corporations to incorporate, or to reincor-
porate, under the law of the state that creates it, thereby generating
franchise fees for the state.5 Still others have contended that a
business court makes it more likely that out-of-state companies will
choose to litigate their disputes before that court, thereby generat-
ing fees for local lawyers.6 The common thread uniting each of these
arguments is the notion that a business court is a product that
serves to facilitate the diversion of economic resources away from
other states to the state that creates the business court.
This Article critically evaluates each of these theories. First, with
respect to the theory that business courts serve to attract or retain
business to a particular state, this Article argues that decisions to
relocate a business in the United States are rarely, if ever, driven by
the high quality of the courts in a particular jurisdiction. Rather,
courts enable court systems to operate more efficiently. Although this Article is concerned
primarily with competition-based rationales, these other rationales are discussed in Part VII.
4. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 192-93 (2011) (“The creation of business
courts ... [is] motivated by the belief that these courts will appeal to businesses and thus
attract them to a state.”); Nees, supra note 1, at 491 (noting that the creation of a business
court may serve to “attract[ ] corporations and businesses to the state”); Carrie A. O’Brien,
The North Carolina Business Court: North Carolina’s Special Superior Court for Complex
Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367, 367 (2002) (“State officials believe the Business
Court will attract out-of-state businesses to the state by developing their understanding of
North Carolina corporate law.”); see also infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Steven J. Cleveland, Process Innovation in the Production of Corporate Law,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1829, 1837 (2008) (“In trying to attract incorporation business, states
may create courts of specialized jurisdiction that appeal to business managers and
investors.”); Kimberly A. Ward, Comment, Getting Down to Business—Pennsylvania Must
Create a Business Court, or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 415 (1999) (“Many
legislators and business leaders believe that the establishment in Pennsylvania of a court
specializing in business disputes would help induce businesses to incorporate in
Pennsylvania, by demonstrating to those businesses that Pennsylvania has a stable judicial
environment.”).
6. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2073, 2092-95 (2009) (citing New York’s creation of a business court as an attempt to
attract litigation business and keep in-state business in New York); see also Jens Dammann
& Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57 (2008)
(“An obvious motivation for making local courts attractive to foreign litigants is to procure
business for the local bar and for other purveyors of services in the host state, such as
restaurants and hotels.”).
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they are driven by a variety of economic factors—including labor
costs and proximity to markets—that have a direct and immediate
impact on a company’s bottom line. It is highly unlikely that any
business, whether in-state or out-of-state, would make a location
decision based on the absence or presence of a specialized business
court. Nevertheless, officials in a sizable number of states have
sought to rationalize the creation of business courts on the ground
that these courts can attract and retain business for the state.
Second, with respect to the theory that business courts will
attract corporate charters to the states that create them, this Article
notes that corporations tend to incorporate in their home state or in
Delaware, and that Delaware’s success in attracting corporate
charters is partly attributable to the high quality of its Court of
Chancery.7 If the purpose of the current crop of business courts is to
attract incorporation business away from Delaware, one would
expect to see these courts replicate some of the unique attributes of
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, such as that court’s focus on cor-
porate law or its practice of resolving all cases without juries. They
do not.8 Nevertheless, some commentators continue to argue that
the creation of a business court by a state may help it to attract
corporate chartering business away from Delaware.
Finally, with respect to the theory that business courts serve to
attract litigation business to a particular state, this Article notes
that such courts can accomplish this end in individual cases. The
Article goes on to identify, however, a number of limitations on the
ability of these courts to attract litigation business. In sum, this
Article concludes that theories emphasizing competition for eco-
nomic resources provide only tenuous support for establishing
business courts. 
This insight matters because it offers useful lessons in institu-
tional design. Specifically, this Article suggests that states should
rethink whether business and technology courts are likely to at-
tract technology companies to a particular jurisdiction, that states
wishing to attract corporate chartering business should rethink the
7. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1572
(2002) (“Firms essentially incorporate in one of only two places: their home state or
Delaware.”).
8. See infra Part VI.B.
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design of their business courts, and that states attempting to attract
litigation business should consider adopting a host of additional
reforms designed to make it more likely that attorneys representing
commercial actors will choose to litigate their disputes before the
state’s business court. These insights can inform the choices made
by states that are planning to adopt business courts in the future
and should also spur those states that have already established
business courts to adjust their respective approaches.
This insight also matters because it highlights the importance of
other rationales for establishing business courts. Confronted with
the reality that the economic benefits to be derived from creating
business courts will flow principally to local attorneys—a group not
historically popular with voters—state officials may cease to invoke
the claim that business courts may be used to compete for economic
resources. Should this occur, then the case for establishing business
courts would rise or fall based primarily on two alternative justifica-
tions: (1) that these courts improve the quality of dispute resolution
in individual cases; and (2) that these courts enhance administra-
tive efficiency within a court system. This Article suggests that
there is some empirical support for the notion that business court
judges render better-reasoned decisions in business disputes than
do generalist courts. The Article also notes, however, the near ab-
sence of any statistical evidence as to whether business courts
enhance administrative efficiency.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief history of
business courts in the United States, describes the core attributes
of such courts, and outlines the basic rationales in support of
creating them. Part II summarizes the theories that seek to justify
and explain the creation of these courts as part of a process of
interstate competition. Part III explains why the establishment of
business courts is unlikely to attract foreign companies to expand
into a particular jurisdiction or, alternatively, to prevent local com-
panies from moving away. Part IV details why the establishment of
a business court, at least as such courts are currently designed, is
unlikely to persuade companies to incorporate or reincorporate in a
particular state. Part V shows that, while business courts may
attract some litigation business to a state, there are limits on their
capacity to achieve this end. Part VI outlines a number of recom-
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mendations as to how to design the next generation of business
courts if the ultimate goal is to divert economic resources from one
jurisdiction to another. Finally, Part VII discusses the viability of
two alternative justifications for creating business courts.
I. THE CORE ATTRIBUTES OF A BUSINESS COURT
A business court is a specialized trial court that hears business
disputes primarily or exclusively.9 Until recently, such courts were
quite rare in the United States. In 1839, New Orleans established
a business court that heard only commercial cases, but the state
legislature dissolved this court in 1846.10 The Delaware Court of
Chancery has played a prominent role in the development of the
nation’s corporate law since the 1930s.11 These examples aside,
there have been few public courts devoted exclusively to hearing
business cases in United States history. The demand for specialized
resolution of business disputes was satisfied, if at all, by private
arbitrators.12
The modern business court movement traces its origins to
New York in the early 1990s.13 Litigants in business cases were
9. The use of the term “business court” throughout this Article should not obscure the
fact that, in many cases, business courts are not formally separate from other trial courts in
a particular jurisdiction. The business court may be a program or a track within existing civil
divisions or, in some cases, a separate division within a court. For the sake of simplicity, I use
the term “business court” as a shorthand reference for all of these approaches except when
the distinction is material.
10. 1839 La. Acts 42-50, repealed by 1846 La. Acts 32-34.
11. Although the Court of Chancery was founded in 1792, its role as an important
corporate law jurisdiction only dates to the 1930s. See Richard J. Agnich & Steven F.
Goldstone, What Business Will Look for in Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DE.
J. CORP. L. 6, 29 (1999) (“[O]ur Court did not begin to surface as a corporate law court until
the early 1930s—after the Depression and 150 years after its creation.” (comments of Hon.
Jack B. Jacobs, V.C., Del. Court of Chancery)); see also Faith Stevelman, Regulatory
Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
57, 71 (2009) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has served as the unofficial ‘highest court’ of
corporate law.”). Stevelman also notes that “[a]bout seventy-five percent of the Court of
Chancery’s docket is composed of corporate and other business-related cases.” Id.
12. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States,11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481-82 (1995)
(discussing commercial arbitration’s long history in the United States).
13. See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 152 (2004). Although Illinois
established its business courts at about the same time, New York’s courts ultimately had
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frustrated by backlog, expense, and inconsistent case manage-
ment.14 In response to these complaints, New York initiated a pilot
project in Manhattan whereby each business case was assigned to
a single judge throughout the litigation.15 In determining which
cases should be assigned to these judges, New York drew up a
laundry list of cases that would qualify as “commercial.”16 These
cases were then automatically assigned to judges in the newly-
created Commercial Division as long as they satisfied certain juris-
dictional requirements.17
As word began to trickle out that the reforms in New York had
enabled the courts in that state to resolve business disputes more
quickly,18 other states started creating business courts of their
own.19 They were assisted in these efforts by the Business Law
Section of the American Bar Association, which formed a subcom-
mittee specifically devoted to advising states on the creation of
business courts.20 By 2011, business courts had been established in
nineteen states across the United States.
These new business courts were, in most cases, created by the
judiciary rather than the legislature.21 The supreme court of a state
more of an influence on the development of other states’ decisions in this area. Id. at 159.
Accordingly, the focus here is on New York’s courts.
14. See id. at 152-53. In Illinois, litigators were particularly frustrated by the master
calendar system, pursuant to which a different judge might handle different aspects of the
same case. See id. at 160.
15. Id. at 152-53. This attribute would become the hallmark of business courts around the
country.
16. Id. at 156-58. In New York, cases designated as “commercial” include certain contract
claims, shareholder derivative suits, and commercial class actions, among others. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(b) (2011).
17. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 156-57.
18. For instance, the time it took to resolve a contract dispute in New York dropped from
648 days in 1992 to 364 days in 2002. Id. at 154.
19. Business courts were subsequently established in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. In some states, such as North Carolina, a business
court operated statewide. See Nees, supra note 1, at 506 tbl.1. In other states, such as
Massachusetts and Illinois, a business court operated in a single large metropolitan area. Id.
at 505, 507 tbl.1. In still other states, such as Florida, business courts were established in
several large metropolitan areas. See id. at 508 tbl.1.
20. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 159-60.
21. See, e.g., id. at 153-54 (noting that New York’s Commercial Division was created
through the office of the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals); id. at 160 (noting
that Illinois’ Commercial Calendar was created by an administrative order issued by the
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or, in some cases, the chief judge of a particular court would issue
an order mandating that “business” cases be assigned to a particu-
lar trial judge whose docket would thereafter be comprised primar-
ily or exclusively of such cases.22 In some states, these judicial
orders were preceded by the creation of a formal advisory committee
or a task force charged with investigating whether a business court
should be created.23 In other states, no formal study was commis-
sioned.
Although these new business courts resembled New York’s in
most respects, they took a variety of tacks in how they defined what
constituted a “commercial” or “business” case eligible for assignment
to the court. Some states followed New York’s lead and drew up a
laundry list of case types that would be assigned to the business
court. This list might include, for example, shareholder derivative
suits, claims arising out of securities transactions, and business
torts.24 Other states, such as North Carolina, stipulated that only
business disputes that were adjudged to be “complex” would be
assigned to the business court.25 This meant that simple contract
presiding judge); id. at 166 (“North Carolina’s Supreme Court established the North Carolina
Business Court.”).
22. See, e.g., id. at 160-62 (describing the individualized Commercial Calendars for judges
in the Cook County Circuit Court); id. at 166-67 (noting that the North Carolina Supreme
Court designated one judge to hear all complex business litigation matters).
23. See, e.g., MD. BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, MARYLAND BUSINESS AND
TECHNOLOGY COURT TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (2000), available at http://www.courts.state.
md.us/finalb&treport.pdf (stating that the General Assembly formed the Task Force for the
purpose of “consider[ing] the feasibility of establishing a specialized court function ... to
adjudicate business and technolgy disputes”); SPECIAL COMM. ON SUPERIOR COURT
BUS./COMPLEX LITIG., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.
delawarebusinesslitigation.com/uploads/file/Special%20Committee%20on%20Superior%20
Court%20Business%20Complex%20Litigation%20Report.doc; Press Release, Me. Supreme
Judicial Court, Formation of the Judicial Branch Business and Consumer Docket Advisory
Committee, available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine_courts/committees/
ANNOUNCEBCDAC8-06.pdf (announcing the Committee’s role in developing the “Business
and Consumer Docket of the Maine State Court System”).
24. See, e.g., OHIO CT. TEMP. SUPERINTENDENCE R. 1.03.
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(a) (2010) (creating mandatory jurisdiction in the state’s
business court for seven categories of complex cases); N.C. SUP. & DIST. CTS. GEN. PRACTICE
R. 2.1 (listing factors to be considered in deciding whether a case qualifies as a “complex”
business case); see also Memorandum from I. Beverly Lake, Jr., Chief Justice, N.C. Supreme
Court, to Superior Court Judges, Guidelines for Assignment of Cases to the North Carolina
Business Court (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/New/links/
CJ%20Guidelines%203%2007%2001.pdf (stating that cases arising under certain chapters of
the General Statutes “will be assigned as complex business cases”). Other states—including
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cases would still be heard by the regular trial courts, whereas com-
plex contract cases would be assigned to the business court. Still
other states, such as Maryland, sought to attract technology com-
panies to the state by defining “complex” cases eligible to be heard
by the business court to include those in which “business or tech-
nology issues predominate over other issues presented in the
action.”26 Thus, while there was broad agreement across states that
“business” disputes could be referred to a business court, there was
some variation as to which disputes were qualified to be heard by
which courts.
In defining the scope of cases to be assigned to its business courts,
it is noteworthy that no state has followed the lead of Delaware’s
Court of Chancery.27 The Court of Chancery’s prominence as a
business court is based principally on its jurisprudence relating to
corporate cases (i.e., equitable disputes between the shareholders,
directors, and officers of a particular corporation).28 This court only
rarely hears commercial cases (i.e., claims for money damages
arising out of a variety of other business disputes).29 Partly in re-
sponse to the limited jurisdictional reach of the Court of Chancery,
the Delaware Superior Court recently created a separate business
Arizona, California, and Connecticut—established complex civil litigation dockets. See Bach
& Applebaum, supra note 13, at 206-09, 211-14. These courts hear exclusively complex cases,
irrespective of whether the cases grow out of a business dispute. See id. In light of their lack
of any specific connection to business law, these courts are not treated as business courts for
purposes of this Article.
26. See MD. CT. R. 16-205(c) (stating that a judge may assign an action to a business court
after determining that “the action presents commercial or technological issues of such a
complex or novel nature that specialized treatment is likely to improve the administration of
justice”).
27. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 223 n.637 (“The Delaware Court of
Chancery ... provides [a] model, but it does not appear that other jurisdictions are looking to
establish an equity court model for their business courts.”).
28. See Nees, supra note 1, at 480-81. Corporate law is generally understood to “primarily
govern the relationship between a company’s managers and investors.” Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 546-47
(1990). 
29. Cf. Nees, supra note 1, at 480-81. Commercial law is generally understood to refer to
“[t]he substantive law dealing with the sale and distribution of goods, the financing of credit
transactions on the security of the goods sold, and negotiable instruments.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 305 (9th ed. 2009). Most modern business courts hear a mixture of corporate and
commercial cases, which are together frequently described as “business” cases. See supra text
accompanying note 24. This Article refers to “corporate” and “commercial” law collectively as
“business” law.
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court, the Complex Commercial Litigation Division, which closely
resembles the model pioneered by New York.30 Thus, although the
Court of Chancery has a long and illustrious history as a business
court focused on corporate law, to the extent that modern business
courts trace their basic structure back to a single progenitor, it is to
the New York Commercial Division, not the Court of Chancery.31
A number of states have also excluded certain categories of cases
from the business court’s jurisdiction.32 The rules of the Commerce
Program of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, for example,
specify that the business court is not permitted to hear actions
relating to personal injury or individual products liability, among
others.33 In Ohio, the list of exclusions promulgated by the state
Supreme Court includes wrongful death claims, noncommercial
landlord-tenant disputes, and employment law cases.34 These
exclusions were in many cases driven by the need to win support for
30. In the Complex Commercial Litigation Division, which was created in 2010, cases are
assigned to a single superior court judge throughout the litigation. Cases are generally eligible
for assignment to the division if the amount in controversy exceeds $1 million or if they
involve an exclusive choice of court agreement. DEL. SUPER. CT., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT JUDGE NO. 2010-3, at 1-3 (May 1, 2010) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE], available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pdf/
Administrative_Directive_2010-3.pdf. The Division may not hear “any case containing a claim
for personal, physical or mental injury; mortgage foreclosure actions; mechanics’ lien actions;
condemnation proceedings; [or] any case involving an exclusive choice of court agreement
where a party to the agreement is an individual acting primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes or where the agreement relates to an individual or collective contract of
employment.” Id. at 1-2.
31. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 153 n.20 (recognizing “New York’s influence
on creating business courts nationally”); id. at 177 (noting that Philadelphia’s Commerce Case
Management Program was “[p]atterned after New York’s Commercial Division”); id. at 180
& n.273 (observing that the creation of the Business Litigation Section in the Superior Court
of Massachusetts “was the result of a five year process that began in the wake of the New
York Commercial Division’s creation”); id. at 185 (reporting that Nevada’s Chief Justice, the
author of the rules creating business courts in Nevada, “thought that the New York model
would be better within Nevada’s court system”); id. at 195 (observing that the “new [Florida]
Business Court Subdivision’s jurisdiction is most similar to that found in New York and
Philadelphia”).
32. These lists of exclusions have a long history. The New Orleans Commercial Court,
which was disbanded in 1846, was not permitted to hear cases relating to the ownership or
possession of land, the ownership of slaves, domestic relations, tort suits, or eminent domain
expropriations. See 1839 La. Acts 44.
33. See First Judicial Dist. of Pa., Criteria for Assignment of Cases to Commerce Program,
PHILADELPHIA CTS., http://fjd.phila.gov/pdf/cpcvcomprg/criteria.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2012). 
34. OHIO CT. TEMP. SUPERINTENDENCE R. 1.03(B).
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the court among plaintiffs’ lawyers, who had expressed concerns
that business court judges might be biased in favor of business
interests; these lawyers did not want to litigate personal injury
suits, for example, before a business court.35
Against this backdrop, business court advocates have identified
three principal rationales for creating these courts. First, such
courts are said to result in a higher quality of decisions in individual
cases and to generate more and better-reasoned decisions in the
fields of corporate and commercial law.36 Second, such courts are
said to improve the administrative efficiency of a state court sys-
tem.37 Finally, business courts are said to facilitate the diversion of
economic resources from one jurisdiction to another as part of a
broader process of interjurisdictional competition.38 The theoretical
underpinnings for this third rationale, which is the primary concern
of this Article, are examined at greater length in the next Part. 
II. THEORIES OF LEGAL INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
There is little doubt that the diffusion of legal and institutional
innovations can occur through a process of economic competition.39
Pursuant to this competition, states vie with one another to provide
new and innovative legal rules and institutions that attract busi-
nesses, tax revenue, and jobs away from other jurisdictions.40 States
are thus incentivized to innovate and to adopt innovations pioneered
by other states out of concern that they will wind up on the losing
end of this ongoing competition for economic resources.41 In order
35. See Nees, supra note 1, at 529 (noting that exceptions for these types of cases were
made in response to “opposition from groups such as plaintiffs’ bar”); Elaine R. Friedman, New
Business Courts Gain Acceptance but Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Seek to Block State Legislation, NAT’L
L.J., Jan. 6, 1997, at B1.
36. See infra Part VII.A.
37. See infra Part VII.B.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See BAUM, supra note 4, at 193 (“Business courts ... reflect competition as a
mechanism for the diffusion of innovations.”); see also Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard
Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of Social Learning and Economic Competition
on State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 POL. RES. Q. 39, 39 (2004).
40. See BAUM, supra note 4, at 193; see also ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE
LAW MARKET 217 (2009). 
41. Economic competition thus simultaneously justifies the creation and explains the
spread of a particular innovation.
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for this competition to take place, of course, there must be some
“product” for which there exists both supply and demand.42 In the
business court context, the product is a particular mode of dispute
resolution.
The demand for this product comes from in-state and out-of-state
companies that would prefer, all other things being equal, to litigate
their disputes before an impartial tribunal that understands the
relevant law and that will resolve the dispute quickly and fairly.43
The product itself is supplied by the state, which may choose to
create courts that possess these characteristics. States do not,
however, have a monopoly on the supply of systems of dispute
resolution. A thriving system of private arbitration may be said to
compete with the public courts on the supply side.44 The interplay
42. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 40, at 3 (“Parties ... can shop for law, just as they
do for other goods.”); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 233, 261 (1985) (arguing that state laws act as “products”
that corporations select when deciding where to incorporate). The most famous example of
this phenomenon can be found in the literature relating to corporate chartering. When a
company is deciding where to incorporate, it is choosing which state’s corporate law shall
govern its internal affairs. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters:
History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 887 n.6 (1990). In theory, states may try to
persuade out-of-state companies to reincorporate under their own law, thereby generating
franchise fees for the state, by making changes to their corporate law. See, e.g., id. at 891-92
& n.21.
43. Cf. Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and
Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO
THE RULE OF LAW 96, 126 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (recognizing this
phenomenon playing out in the Indian court system, and noting that “[t]here is a market for
courts that give prompt and enforceable judgments. Where the state fails to provide such
courts, others who appreciate their potential ... will try to fill the vacuum.”).
44. See R. Franklin Balotti & Roland E. Brandel, Business Bench: Are Special Courts the
Future? BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 25, 27 (noting that business courts represent a
potentially viable alternative to arbitration); Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and
the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 493 (2009) (discussing the
“extent to which competition from business courts is likely to impact the future of
arbitration”); Robert L. Haig, Can New York’s New Commercial Division Resolve Business
Disputes as Well as Anyone?, 13 TOURO L. REV. 191, 195-96 (1996) (observing that the task
force asked to create New York’s business courts was aware that “[b]usinesses which had a
choice often preferred to litigate in federal court, in the courts of other states such as
Delaware and in private dispute resolution forums provided by such entities as the American
Arbitration Association”); Editorial, Musical Benches, N.J. L.J., Mar. 17, 1997, at 81
(“Increasing competition from alternative dispute resolution furnished the impetus for Essex
County’s experiment.... It is an amusing illustration of Adam Smith’s invisible hand that the
justice system has felt it necessary to improve efficiency in order to prevent consumers from
flocking to the competition.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the
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between the business entities on the demand side and courts and
arbitrators on the supply side has led some observers to label this
a market for dispute resolution or, alternatively, a market for
adjudication.45
Modern legal scholarship traces the general concept of a market
for adjudication to a famous article by William Landes and Richard
Posner in which the authors cite a number of historical examples of
competitive markets for the provision of judicial services.46 They
also specifically note the possibility of competition between modern
public court systems and consider whether such a system is likely
to generate rules that are economically efficient.47 In this context,
they offer the following discussion in which they explicate the dy-
namics likely to underlie this competition:
Imagine a system in which there are several courts, public or
private, with overlapping jurisdictions, and the judges are paid
out of litigant fees and therefore have a direct pecuniary interest
in attracting business away from competing courts.... [I]t might
seem that competition would lead to an optimal set of substan-
tive rules and procedural safeguards. But this is incorrect. The
competition would be for plaintiffs, since it is the plaintiff who
determines the choice among courts having concurrent jurisdic-
tion of his claim. The competing courts would offer not a set of
rules designed to optimize dispute resolution but a set designed
to favor plaintiffs regardless of efficiency.48
Setting to one side the question of whether the market for adjud-
ication inevitably leads to the production of plaintiff-friendly rules,
Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 50 n.277 (1997) (“[Arbitration] may soon
face increasing competition as an adjudicative alternative. The concept of a commercial court,
long a fixture in many civil law jurisdictions, has recently spurred interest in the United
States.”).
45. See, e.g., Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss
with Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 85-93 (2005) (describing market for dispute resolution services).
46. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 241, 243, 254, 257 (1979); see also Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional
Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2007)
(“[I]mportant features of the common law, including the structure of contract law, can be
explained as the result of competition among courts and the constraints on that
competition.”).
47. See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 253-54.
48. Id. at 254.
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it is noteworthy that state court judges in the United States lack the
pecuniary motives attributed to them by Landes and Posner.49
These judges are not paid out of litigant fees; rather, they are
salaried employees of the state or, in some cases, the city or county
in which they sit.50 All other things being equal, the judges have no
monetary incentives to attract cases to their home jurisdictions
because it will mean more work for them with no corresponding
increase in compensation.51 Accordingly, scholars who claim that a
market for adjudication currently exists have been forced to identify
other actors with incentives to promote innovation with respect to
the court system. The most commonly cited actors are the state
itself and local lawyers.
A. Supply Side: State Incentives
Turning first to the state, it is important to note that although the
conditions for a market for adjudication may exist—in that commer-
cial actors demand certain laws or institutions and the state is able
to supply them—it does not necessarily follow that states will
compete in a market for adjudication. The state, after all, is not
exclusively an economic actor. Many high-ranking state officials
are subject to unique constraints—most notably the requirement
that they stand for reelection at periodic intervals—and these
constraints may limit their willingness to produce products for
consumption in any market for adjudication.52 If the state decides
49. See Paul D. Carrington, Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 305 (1979) (noting incentives of public courts to send business to their competitors).
50. See Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 249.
51. This does not mean, of course, that judges may not have other motives for wanting to
see legal disputes resolved by litigation rather than by arbitration or for competing to attract
cases to their home jurisdiction. They may, for example, be concerned that the legitimacy of
the judicial system as a whole may suffer if litigants routinely decide to avoid the courts.
Alternatively, judges who preside over cases involving large sums of money may derive
prestige by virtue of their association with the case. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING
FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20
(2005). These potential benefits notwithstanding, modern state court judges generally do not
derive any direct monetary benefit by attracting cases to their jurisdiction. Id. (“Attracting
big cases changes neither the salary nor the pension [of judges].”).
52. Indeed, states may choose not to compete in the market for dispute resolution services
if private alternatives such as arbitration exist. The more parties that resolve their disputes
via arbitration, the fewer the number of cases that are litigated in the state’s courts, which
reduces the cost to the state.
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not to adopt a particular law or create a specialized court, then the
preferences of out-of-state actors are simply not relevant. Absent
supply, there can be no market.
Nevertheless, scholars have advanced a number of reasons why
it may be in the state’s economic interests to create a business court.
First, they have argued that business courts help the state to attract
or retain businesses.53 This increased economic activity generates
revenue for the state in the form of wage and sales taxes; that
revenue in turn enables the state to provide more services to its
populace or, alternatively, to lower the tax burden on state resi-
dents. Second, they have argued that business courts help the state
to attract out-of-state companies to reincorporate under that state’s
law.54 Since corporations incorporated under the law of a particular
state must pay annual franchise fees to the state, attracting
incorporations may enable the state to provide more services to its
populace or reduce taxes.55 Under either of these two theories, the
state has a direct financial incentive to participate in the market for
adjudication by creating business courts.
B. Supply Side: Lawyer Incentives
Turning now to the lawyers, some scholars have noted that
attorneys have strong incentives to lobby the state to supply legal
innovations that can generate fees for local lawyers.56 Jonathan
Macey and Geoffrey Miller have argued that the Delaware bar
heavily influences the legal rules supplied by that state.57
53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility:
Challenges for the Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817,
824 (2009) (noting that states’ realization of significant revenues from incorporation fees led
to their relaxing of local limits on companies’ flexibility); see also Harwell Wells, The
Modernization of Corporate Law, 1920-40, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 583-84 (2009) (noting how,
during the beginning of the modern era of corporate law, New Jersey’s corporate legal regime
led to it being the “preferred state of incorporation,” and the fees generated “allowed it to
eliminate its state property tax”).
56. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law,
37 GA. L. REV. 363, 367 (2003) (discussing lawyer incentives in promoting laws that would
encourage parties to establish contacts with the state).
57. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472-73 (1987); see also Larry E. Ribstein & Erin
Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 684-85.
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Specifically, they claim that corporate decision rules in Delaware
are generated in a political process dominated by the state’s bar,
which is principally interested in maximizing the fees paid to
Delaware lawyers on behalf of Delaware corporations.58 By their
account, Delaware lawyers are interested in attracting charters
principally because these charters are likely to attract more
business from out-of-state companies.59 If there were some other
legal innovation that would result in the lawyers obtaining even
more business from these companies, such as a business court, then
those lawyers would doubtless support that innovation as well.
There are other examples of legal innovations whose creation
seems to have been driven, at least in part, by self-interested lob-
bying by lawyers.60 Geoffrey Miller and Theodore Eisenberg discuss
New York’s efforts to encourage out-of-state companies to choose
New York law to govern their high-value commercial agreements or,
even better, to choose to litigate their high-value commercial
disputes in New York courts.61 Miller and Eisenberg also highlight
decisions by New York legislators and attorneys to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in New York.62 The 1984 passage of sections
58. Macey & Miller, supra note 57, at 503.
59. Id. at 503-04. If push came to shove, Miller and Macey argue that the bar would
probably favor rules increasing the amount of litigation as opposed to the amount of advisory
work because it is more difficult for out-of-state companies to compete for the former. Id. at
504-05.
60. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2073-74 (“New York attracts contracts by
offering a menu of substantive rules that are desired by the contracting parties and by
providing prompt, efficient, and reliable procedures and institutions for resolving disputes.
Attracting contracts serves the state’s economic interests and increases demand for the
services of New York attorneys.”).
61. See id. at 2079-98. In 1984, the New York legislature enacted a statute directing New
York courts to respect choice-of-law clauses selecting New York law in certain high-value
contracts regardless of whether the contract or the parties had any other connection to the
state. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. 2006). In that same year, the legislature also
enacted a companion statute directing New York courts to hear cases that otherwise had no
connection to the state if the case involved a high-value contract, the contract contained a
choice-of-law clause selecting New York law, and the defendant agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of New York courts. Id. § 5-1402 (Consol. 2006); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(b)
(Consol. 1999) (directing courts not to dismiss on inconvenient forum grounds when section
5-1402 applies). The combined effect of the two statutes is to make it easier for parties to
high-dollar-value commercial agreements that otherwise lack a connection to New York to
litigate disputes arising out of their agreement in that state, thereby generating more
business for New York lawyers. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2074.
62. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2080-87.
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5-1401 and 5-1402 of the New York General Obligations Law,63 they
note, was preceded by an aggressive lobbying effort by the New York
Bar Association.64 Viewed against this broader backdrop of legal
innovations, the creation of business courts by states can be seen as
yet another legal innovation designed to generate legal business for
in-state attorneys.65 Under this theory, one goal of these courts is
the diversion of litigation and arbitration business away from courts
and arbitrators in other states and to the business courts in the
lawyers’ home state; alternatively, this goal can be viewed as the
retention of litigation and arbitration business that might otherwise
have gone to a different state.66
Thus, even if state court judges lack financial incentives to
innovate and create new business courts, these incentives may still
exist on the part of the state itself (to increase tax revenue through
economic development or through the corporate chartering business)
or local lawyers (to maximize fees paid to in-state lawyers).
C. Demand Side: Company Incentives
Turning now to the demand side, it is important to note that a
viable market for adjudication may also fail to develop because out-
of-state commercial actors exhibit too little demand for the product
being supplied by the state.67 If the fact that a state has supplied a
particular legal innovation is irrelevant to the decision making of
63. See supra note 61.
64. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2091-92; see also N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, COMM.
ON FOREIGN & COMPARATIVE LAW, PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNING-
LAW CLAUSES AND RELATED CLAUSES IN SIGNIFICANT COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 537, 548-50
(1983) (suggesting that New York’s “legal and business communities” would benefit “if signif-
icant agreements are governed by New York law and if significant commercial litigation is
conducted in the state” and recommending passage of sections 5-1401 and 5-1402).
65. Miller and Eisenberg cite New York’s creation of a business court as an additional
innovation that seems likely to generate more business for New York lawyers. See Miller &
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2092-95. Another legal innovation that may serve to attract
litigation is a long statute of limitations. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 528
(1990) (noting Mississippi’s incentive to attract plaintiffs’ personal injury suits through a long
statute of limitations).
66. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2095 (noting the observation of New York’s
chief judge that the introduction of the business court has helped retain commercial litigants
within the state).
67. See id. at 2079 (noting that both supply and demand must exist in order for there to
be a “market” for business litigation fora).
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out-of-state actors, then states cannot be said to be in “competition”
with each other in any meaningful sense because there is no
external demand for their product. The validity of competition-based
theories explaining the creation of business courts thus depends on
whether the actors on the demand side of the equation are likely to
respond to a particular legal innovation. Absent any meaningful
response by out-of-state actors, it is a mistake to view the innova-
tion in question as part of an attempt to “compete” with similar
innovations produced in other states. There can be no real competi-
tion if there is no external demand.
* * *
The next three Parts of this Article evaluate the most popular
theories of economic competition that have been used to justify the
creation of business courts: (1) creating business courts attracts and
retains businesses,68 (2) creating business courts attracts incorpora-
tion business,69 and (3) creating business courts generates litigation
business for local lawyers.70
III. COMPETING FOR BUSINESS ACTIVITY
The first, and by far the most popular, theory of economic compet-
ition cites the business court as the product of competition among
states to attract business activity.71 This theory suggests that the
creation of a business court serves both to attract out-of-state
companies to the state and to keep in-state companies from moving
their operations elsewhere.72 Under this theory, states that compete
68. See infra Part III.
69. See infra Part IV.
70. See infra Part V.
71. See, e.g., Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class
Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
899, 954 (2008) (“Florida’s stated purpose in establishing business courts is to provide
economic stimulus in the community by drawing business to relocate to Florida.”). The term
“business activity” is broad enough to encompass a wide range of possible actions. This
includes, among other things, opening new stores, creating new manufacturing centers,
setting up new offices, starting a franchise, or creating new distribution centers.
72. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 5, at 421 (noting that proponents of a Pennsylvania
business court thought the idea “would provide a reason for a Pennsylvania business to
remain in the commonwealth and for other businesses to locate in Pennsylvania”). For a
variation on this theory, albeit one framed around the idea of competing for “investment,” see
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successfully by establishing business courts will enjoy faster eco-
nomic development and job growth than states that do not.73
This theory appears in numerous states’ official accounts of bus-
iness court creation. For example, the official report calling for the
establishment of the North Carolina Business Court stated that one
of the goals of the court was to “attract[ ] new businesses to the
State.”74 In Colorado, a report issued by the Governor’s Task Force
on Civil Justice Reform noted that “a business court could develop
the expertise and specialized procedures needed to help Colorado
attract and retain world-class employers and employees alike.”75
Additional statements along these lines have been made by local
officials and commentators in Florida,76 Maryland,77 Maine,78
Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1743-50 (2006)
(distinguishing between states that revise their corporate law to compete for incorporations
and those that revise their corporate law to compete for investment).
73. See, e.g., Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 176 (discussing the Philadelphia Bar
Association Chancellor’s recognition that business courts can combat job and business losses);
Ward, supra note 5, at 415, 421 (noting the labeling of business courts as an “economic
development tool”).
74. CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION (2004), available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/ref/Final%20
Commission%20Report.htm.
75. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, FINAL
REPORT OF GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 3 (Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.
state.co.us/cjrtf/report/report.htm.
76. Fla. Cir. Ct., Ninth Jud. Cir., Amended Order Creating Specialized Business Court
Sub-Division of the Civil Division of the Circuit Court, at 2 (Nov. 26, 2003) (“[T]he
establishment of a Business court may become one more factor in helping our community to
attract new businesses that are looking to re-locate.”); Complex Business Litigation Court,
NINTH JUD. CIRCUIT CT. FLA., http://www.ninthcircuit.org/about/divisions/civil/complex-
business-litigation-court.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (“The theory that a specialized
Business Court will draw big businesses to Central Florida has proven true in the states
where Business Courts have been established. Businesses are drawn to areas where courts
understand the complexity of business litigation.”).
77. See MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, Issue: Business and Technology Court, in 2003 STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 92 (“A business court would make Maryland a more attractive state
for resident businesses to stay and for corporations in other states and countries to relocate.”).
78. See Noel K. Gallagher, Order in the Court for Business Disputes, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Portland, Me.), Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.pressherald.com/archive/order-in-the-
Court-for-business-disputes_2009-03-06.html (quoting a local Maine lawyer who stated that
“we need (the business court) if we want to attract the kind of business that will keep us
vibrant”).
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Michigan,79 Minnesota,80 Mississippi,81 New Jersey,82 Ohio,83
Pennsylvania,84 and West Virginia.85
This particular argument has also been forcefully articulated by
professional organizations that have urged state legislatures to
create more business courts. For example, the Business Law Section
of the American Bar Association has stated that states should
consider establishing business courts in order to “[b]e competitive
from an economic development standpoint with other states/juris-
dictions which have established business courts.”86 Perhaps the
79. See Jacob A. Sommer, Note, Business Litigation and Cyberspace: Will Cyber Courts
Prove an Effective Tool for Luring High-Tech Businesses into Forum States?, 56 VAND. L. REV.
561, 576 (2003) (“Michigan Governor John Engler outlined a series of initiatives designed to
attract inventors, entrepreneurs, small-tech, and information technology firms to the state.
One of the initiatives was the creation of a connected court that could satisfy the demands of
high-tech business.” (footnote omitted)); Robert Ankeny, A Conversation with Diane Akers,
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Mar. 14, 2005, at 11 (noting that the former chair of the business court
committee of the State Bar of Michigan’s business law section believed that “[i]f the Michigan
economy wants to attract and retain business and create more favorable business conditions,
a business court can help do that”).
80. See Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts: Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?,
24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) (noting business court supporters’ claim that
“[b]etter resolution of business matters is often a key factor in ‘business climate’ discussions
and in attracting and retaining business” in Minnesota).
81. Delbert Hosemann, Miss. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the First Meeting of the Business
Courts Study Group 1 (May 20, 1998), available at http://www.sos.ms.gov/links/pol_res/
business_courts/meeting01_minutes.pdf (stating that he viewed the creation of a business
court as part of a broader project to “make Mississippi the most business-friendly and
competitive state”).
82. See Stuart A. Hoberman, Letter from the President of the New Jersey State Bar
Association to the Readers of the Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., Jan. 2006, at 66 (“The creation of a business court and its attendant benefits are
among those factors which might attract business to New Jersey. A number of jurisdictions
... have created business courts in order to attract business and improve their states’ business
climate.”).
83. See Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n, Cuyahoga County Commercial Docket 27 (Jan. 16,
2009) (PowerPoint presentation on file with author) (observing that by creating a business
court, the “Ohio judiciary will contribute to attracting and retaining business in Ohio”).
84. Ward, supra note 5, at 421 (“[D]evelopment of a commerce court is vital to
[Philadelphia’s] ability to retain and attract business.” (quoting the president of the Greater
Philadelphia Chamber of Business)).
85. See Chris Dickerson, Thompson Pleased Business Court Bill Signed into Law, W. VA.
REC. (May 20, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/226979-thompson-pleased-
business-court-plan (“The biggest benefit [of a business court] would be attracting new
businesses to the state.”).
86. AM. BAR ASS’N, ESTABLISHING BUSINESS COURTS IN YOUR STATE 2008-2009, at 1,
available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CL150011/sitesofinterest_
Files/establishing-business-courts0809.pdf (observing that the creation of a business court will
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clearest articulation of this theory comes from Lee Applebaum, an
attorney who has written extensively in support of business courts:
[C]ompetitive implications between cities and states are un-
deniable. The business court becomes a means to give businesses
and their lawyers confidence that business and commercial
disputes will be decided with informed and deliberate reasoning.
This adds a component of stability to a state, region, or city that
wants to keep or attract businesses. If a city or state has such a
court, and its neighbor does not, that neighboring city or state
may come to sense a potential disadvantage. The concentration
of business courts along the East Coast may be explained, in
some part, by this potential for competitive disadvantage.87
The theory, therefore, is that business courts may attract out-of-
state business to the jurisdiction that creates them or, alternatively,
may prevent local businesses from relocating elsewhere, as part of
a broader competition among the states for economic resources.
Although none of the advocates listed above have specified what
sort of “business” they expect business courts to attract, they are
probably referring to the decision by an out-of-state company to
“locate” in the state by choosing to open a new store, build a new
factory, or move its offices to the state. These location decisions can
have a significant impact on the state’s economy through the cre-
ation of jobs for state residents and the concomitant generation of
tax dollars for state governments.88 Accordingly, I assume for the
sake of the following analysis that state efforts to “attract business”
enable a jurisdiction to “[i]mprove overall infrastructure of [the] entire community by creating
a forum that makes conducting business in that region more attractive, predictable and
reliable”); see also Lee Applebaum, Letter, The Business of Business Courts, TRIAL, Sept. 2006,
at 8, 8 (“[O]ne goal in creating business courts is to create a litigation environment that
encourages businesses to stay in or locate to a region.”).
87. Lee Applebaum, The “New” Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and
Commercial Disputes, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 13, 16. Applebaum also observes that
business courts “have garnered respect ... for their expertise, efficacy, and internal efficiencies,
as well as because of the belief that taking business and commercial cases off of the general
docket allows other kinds of cases to move more efficiently” and that “[s]uch results have
merited, and continue to merit, emulation and consideration by other states.” Id.
88. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1721 (2010)
(“[I]ndividual states receive various potential benefits from attracting [company] incor-
porations, including increased tax revenue.”).
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by establishing a business court are, in fact, efforts to persuade out-
of-state companies to locate, or re-locate, brick-and-mortar shops,
factories, or offices in the state that created the business court.89 
The notion of attracting businesses to a state, understood in this
way, is intimately bound up with the idea of a state’s “business cli-
mate.” This term can refer either to actual factors that drive a
company’s decision as to where to do business or to the perception
that a particular state is a desirable place to do business.90 The
creation of a business court, viewed through either lens, could thus
be viewed as an effort to improve a state’s business climate.91
The claim that the creation of a business court may be an actual
factor driving a company’s business decisions is facially plausible.
Litigation can be expensive and time consuming. Judges may lack
a basic understanding of economics—let alone the complexities of
sophisticated business transactions—or have little interest in
business law.92 There may only be a few decisions published each
year in a particular area of commercial law in a particular state,
which makes it hard for businesses to know what the law is in
89. Alternatively, they could simply be referring to an increase in sales by in-state
companies to out-of-state companies or to an increase in the number of franchising or
distributorship agreements between in-state companies and out-of-state companies. However,
given the more attenuated benefits likely to accrue to in-state residents and the state itself
from these alternatives, it seems most plausible that efforts to attract business are primarily
efforts to drive location decisions.
90. See LIESL EATHINGTON, AARON L. TODD & DAVE SWENSON, WEATHERING THE STORM
OF BUSINESS CLIMATE RANKINGS 5 (2005) (describing business climate as “a set of factors
believed to contribute to regional economic growth” or, alternatively, as “an intangible asset
in the form of a regional reputation for business friendliness”).
91. An ever-growing number of organizations publish “business climate rankings” that
purport to evaluate whether a state is taking steps to foster a business-friendly environment.
Notwithstanding their widespread circulation, these rankings tend not to be particularly
accurate predictors of economic performance. See PETER FISHER, GRADING PLACES: WHAT DO
THE BUSINESS CLIMATE RANKINGS REALLY TELL US? 73 (2005). The five best-known ranking
systems have such drastically different conclusions that thirty-four states can claim a spot in
the top ten and “[t]he average state’s best ranking is 26 positions above its worst.” Id. at 71-
72; see also Robert D. Atkinson, Understanding Business Climate Studies: Their Use and
Validity, ECON. DEV. REV., Winter 1990, at 46, 47-48.
92. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 758 (2000) (“[C]ourts have trouble understanding the simplest of
business relationships. This is not surprising. Judges must be generalists, but they usually
have narrow backgrounds in a particular field of the law.”); see also Miller & Eisenberg, supra
note 6, at 2093 (observing that New York trial judges are political selections including little
consideration of candidates’ background in business).
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advance.93 In choosing where to do business, a company would logi-
cally prefer to do business in a state where the costs of litigation are
lower, where a specialized judge was tasked with resolving its
business disputes, and where there was a robust body of case law
relating to business matters.94 To the extent that a business court
satisfies each of these needs, it could serve as an effective tool for
attracting businesses to a particular state.
With respect to the claim that a business court may attract
business to a state by contributing to the perception that a state is
business-friendly, this claim also has a certain surface appeal. If
perception is all that matters, then the creation of a business court
could signal receptivity to business that would be effective by itself,
irrespective of any actual impact that the business court’s opera-
tions may have on business incentives. In making location decisions,
a company will likely balance the pros and cons of expansion in a
particular region against one another in a methodical manner.
When these factors are in equipoise, however, the ultimate decision
may come down to the company executives’ gut instincts. These gut
decisions are, almost by definition, driven as much by emotion as by
logic, and the outcomes of such decisions may be driven by subcon-
scious positive associations about a particular state. To the extent
that these associations are a direct result of a state’s long-standing
efforts to brand itself as a positive business environment, then
perception may matter as much as reality.
In the following Sections, I explain why each of these two argu-
ments—and hence the theory that posits that business courts
should be created in order to attract business activity—is ultimately
unpersuasive. I first examine the claim that business courts are
likely to play a significant role in actually attracting foreign
93. My research assistant identified and coded the published decisions in each state by
searching the appropriate state corporate law databases in LexisNexis. Between 2000 and
2010 there were, excluding veil-piercing cases, only seventeen published decisions by all the
appellate courts in the state of Kansas that addressed corporate law issues, a rate of just 1.7
cases per year. The rate in several other states over this timeframe is comparable: Arizona
(0.6 cases per year); Michigan (0.6 cases per year); Maine (0.7 cases per year); Washington (1.5
cases per year); North Carolina (2.6 cases per year); and Texas (3.1 cases per year).
94. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J.
CORP. L. 771, 776-78 (2009) (attributing the high volume of corporate incorporations in
Delaware to its sophisticated bench, efficient litigation process, and clear, numerous corporate
precedents).
1940 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1915
companies to a state.95 I then examine the claim that the perception
of receptivity to business generated by business courts is itself a
useful economic development tool.
A. The Irrelevance of Dispute Resolution
Let us first consider the claim that business courts are likely to
play a meaningful role in shaping the actual incentives of out-of-
state companies trying to decide whether to locate shops, factories,
or offices in a particular state. In order for this claim to be true, it
must be the case that out-of-state companies, in weighing the
myriad factors that inform a decision to expand their operations into
a particular jurisdiction, would view the presence of a business court
in a particular jurisdiction as meaningful. In other words, there
must be some demand for high-quality dispute resolution systems
among out-of-state companies that are weighing whether to locate
in a particular state. This inquiry thus necessitates a close examina-
tion of the various factors that companies consider when making
their expansion decisions.
A comprehensive review of these factors reveals that the presence
of high-quality courts in a jurisdiction ranks far down on the list of
priorities of firms weighing the decision of where to expand, if it is
even mentioned at all.96 Instead, most studies suggest that business
expansion decisions are driven largely by economic factors rather
95. The discussion herein is primarily focused on the notion that the state is seeking to
attract foreign businesses to the state. However, another possible take on this idea is that the
business court is simply trying to keep in-state businesses from moving elsewhere. In other
words, the competition is about retaining businesses rather than about attracting them. Given
the arguments outlined in this Section highlighting the extremely weak effect that the
creation of a business court has on company incentives, it is just as unlikely that a company
will remain in a jurisdiction because it has created a business court as it is that an out-of-
state company will move to a jurisdiction because it has created a business court. Accordingly,
the focus here is on attracting out-of-state companies.
96. See EDWIN M. MCPHERSON, PLANT LOCATION SELECTION TECHNIQUES 11-18 (1995)
(listing various factors driving location decisions and emphasizing economic factors); PHILIP
S. ORSINO, SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS EXPANSION: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR PLANNING
PROFITABLE GROWTH 84-85 (1994) (same); ROGER W. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LOCATION
DECISIONS 33-36 (1982) (same); see also James N. Morgan & George Katona, The Quantitative
Study of Factors Determining Business Decisions, 66 Q. J. ECON. 67, 72, 73 tbl.1 (1952) (noting
the results of a survey conducted in Michigan showing that the primary factors driving
location decisions were proximity to markets, labor factors, and proximity to materials). 
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than by legal or regulatory factors.97 Specifically, these studies show
that when businesses are expanding, they focus on issues such as
market size, product demand, distribution channels, infrastructure
quality, customer needs, the availability of capital, and the presence
or absence of competitors, among others.98 These factors—as op-
posed to legal or regulatory factors—are routinely identified as the
primary drivers of business expansion decisions.99
To be sure, the legal or regulatory environment is frequently
mentioned as an additional factor to consider in making location
decisions.100 In this context, however, the focus of attention is
typically on local laws enacted by a state legislature or on regula-
tions promulgated by a state administrative agency.101 While the
quality of the judicial system may operate as a disqualifying factor
in extreme cases—for example, where the courts of a particular
jurisdiction are perceived to be actively hostile to business, or where
the courts of a particular jurisdiction are known to be biased,
97. See MCPHERSON, supra note 96, at 11-18; ORSINO, supra note 96, at 84-85;
SCHMENNER, supra note 96, at 33-36.
98. See, e.g., ORSINO, supra note 96, at 84-85.
99. See, e.g., JOHN P. BLAIR & MICHAEL C. CARROLL, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
ANALYSIS, PRACTICES, AND GLOBALIZATION 40 (2009) (summarizing surveys relating to location
factors, and concluding that “the traditional location factors—(1) markets, (2) labor, (3) new
materials, and (4) transportation—remain the most important location factors”). 
100. See, e.g., ORSINO, supra note 96, at 84. The importance of these factors is, however,
typically downplayed. In his book on business planning, for example, Wesley Truitt identifies
five primary factors driving business planning decisions: (1) the physical environment, (2) the
technological environment, (3) the legal/regulatory environment, (4) the economic environ-
ment, and (5) the sociocultural environment. WESLEY B. TRUITT, BUSINESS PLANNING: A
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK AND PROCESS 80-123 (2002). In the context of the legal/
regulatory environment, Truitt writes that “the system of laws, the dispute resolution system,
the civil order and justice system, rights of redress of grievance, sanctity of contract, and law-
making and law enforcement systems are all part of this [business planning] evaluation.” Id.
at 97-98 (emphasis added). At no point in his book, however, does Truitt cite an example when
dispute resolution impacted business planning, and he devotes no attention to the issue other
than this passing reference.
101. See, e.g., SCHMENNER, supra note 96, at 35 (noting relevance of states’ right-to-work
laws); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It
“to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 336 n.178 (1997) (“This state activity [in passing
environmental legislation] is likely to have increased the variation in environmental
regulations and hence the sensitivity of business location decisions to state environment
regulations.”); David A. Strifling, Environmental Federalism and Effective Regulation of
Nanotechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1129, 1147 (noting one study that found that state
taxes, availability of public services, and the state’s labor unions were “substantially more
significant” to business location decisions than the “stringency of environmental regulation”).
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corrupt, or unreliable—there is otherwise little in these studies to
suggest that the availability of a high-quality judge to resolve busi-
ness disputes matters enormously to businesses making expansion
decisions.102 As the Maryland task force chartered to consider the
feasibility of establishing a state business and technology court
noted in its report: “[N]ot one witness testified that the implementa-
tion of such a [court] will prove to be the deciding factor in whether
a business chooses Maryland as its ... principal place of business.”103 
To highlight the relative importance of legal or regulatory factors
vis-à-vis economic factors in location decisions, let us examine
briefly the role played by tax policies. Many outside observers would
likely believe that tax considerations, which directly impact a
company’s bottom line, would be among the most salient legal or
regulatory factors facing a business considering expansion. Over the
past thirty years, states have offered tax incentives collectively
worth billions of dollars to entice out-of-state companies to expand
or locate in their state.104 Some researchers who have conducted
econometric studies seeking to calculate economic benefits gener-
ated by these tax incentives, however, have taken a skeptical view
of these incentives, concluding that “the proliferation of tax incen-
tives has not produced the intended effect of expanding economic
activity and employment in the competitor states.”105 Surveys of
102. See source cited supra note 99. These studies do show, however, that in other contexts,
the presence of negative factors—as opposed to the presence of positive factors, such as an
expert judge—can function to drive away corporations. See MCPHERSON, supra note 96, at 199
(“On the community scale, local legislation seldom is a factor that attracts industry, although
local legislation may repel industry.”); SCHMENNER, supra note 96, at 46 (“In descriptive
terms, high taxes are more apt to ‘push’ corporations away from potential sites than low taxes
are likely to ‘pull’ corporations in from other sites.”).
103. MD. BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 19; see also BAUM, supra note
4, at 192 (“In contrast with personal injury law, the initiative for this [business court]
movement has come primarily from state policy makers rather than from the business
community.”); id. at 194 (“As for hopes that a business court could improve a state’s economic
situation, it appears that judicial specialization in business cases can have a substantial effect
only under unusual circumstances.”).
104. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 388-89 (1996) (noting tax incentives
designed to attract new plants worth $150 million in Tennessee, $294 million in Indiana, and
$300 million in Alabama).
105. See, e.g., id. at 397. Enrich found that state taxes have minimal significance in
business decisions and concluded that “[r]elative to other costs of doing business, state taxes
are simply too small to have a major influence on business decision making.” Id. at 390-93
(citing numerous econometric studies). Instead, he attributed the reason for offering tax
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corporate real estate executives, moreover, suggest that other eco-
nomic factors dominate the decision-making process. As one exec-
utive has stated:
The business reasons will always prevail in a site search.... I
don’t go looking for a site based on incentives. When we’re doing
a site search, incentives don’t even enter in as one of the criteria
for our original cost analysis.... There are just so many essential
business factors that are so much more important than incen-
tives.106
If tax incentives, which directly impact a corporation’s bottom line,
play, at best, a peripheral role in business location decisions, then
the fact that a jurisdiction has specialized business courts would
seem to border on the irrelevant.
This conclusion derives additional support from the fact that
litigation is a contingent event; there is no guarantee that it will
occur.107 Consequently, issues relating to prospective litigation are
of relatively low salience to business principals ex ante; it is easy to
discount the possibility of litigation when there is a possibility that
it will never occur at all.108 This is the well-documented natural bias
incentives to the political atmosphere of the states and the state officials’ desire to keep their
state competitive. Id. at 392-93.
106. Jack Lyne, Incentives Are Important, Executives Say, but Business Concerns Drive the
Location Process, SITE SELECTION, Apr. 1992, at 1, 1-2, available at http://www.conway.com/
geofacts/pdf/41150.pdf (quoting the director of administrative services for National Computer
Systems) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SCHMENNER, supra note 96, at 46
(stating that “taxes themselves are merely a minor consideration” that are “capable of altering
the decision in favor of a particular site only if almost all other factors are equal”).
107. Once a company reaches a particular size, one can assume that it anticipates being
sued on a semi-regular basis by natural persons who are its customers—slip-and-fall or
breach of warranty cases, perhaps—and by its employees for discrimination or wrongful
termination. For small- and medium-sized companies, however, it is more difficult to predict
when and where lawsuits will arise because they have fewer customers and employees.
108. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications
for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 125 (2003) (finding that experimental
and empirical evidence suggest that “people discount low probability events, treating them
as though they occur with a probability of zero”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (discussing the problem of
“systematic overconfidence in risk judgments”). See generally Colin F. Camerer & Howard
Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565 (1989) (discussing policy problems that arise when individuals
underestimate risks with low probabilities).
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of risk takers to focus on the upside potential as opposed to the
possibility of conflict and loss.109 This sensibility is evident in the
striking number of business contracts that make no provision for
dispute resolution; this absence suggests that the parties would
rather focus their attention on the likely successes of the adventure
than on how to resolve disputes that may or may not arise.110 The
willingness of individuals making decisions on behalf of companies
to discount the likelihood of litigation, at least with respect to a
subset of claims, further undermines the claim that the creation of
business courts will attract out-of-state companies—and hence eco-
nomic activity—to the state.
The presence of a business court is also likely to be of relatively
low salience because business-to-business disputes are often re-
solved informally, without litigation.111 Business law scholars de-
scribe a “dispute pyramid” with business contracts at the bottom.112
In the words of Terence Dunworth and Joel Rogers: 
When a subset of [business] transactions is perceived as
injurious by one or more of the parties, grievances result. Going
up the pyramid, with successively fewer participants in each
category, we have informal grievances, formal claims, ongoing
disputes, disputes involving lawyers, and, at the apex of the
109. See ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 751 (2d ed.
2010) (noting that business partners “frequently agree upon an allocation of profits but are
silent about losses because they do not anticipate losing money”); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 53 (2010) (observing that “dispute
resolution provisions tend to be accorded low priority in negotiations” because parties intent
on sealing a deal are reluctant to dwell on the subject of relational conflict); see also Page v.
Page, 359 P.2d 41, 43 (Cal. 1961) (quoting the defendant in a business lawsuit as saying, “We
never figured on losing [profits], I guess”).
110. See John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Interest in International Arbitration, 90 AM. J. INT’L
L. 40, 50 (1996) (observing that international contracts “often contain no choice-of-law clause,
and when they do, the provision is often ambiguous with respect to the applicable law,
substantive or procedural, relating to the awarding of interest”); Stipanowich, supra note 109,
at 53.
111. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know and Think We Know About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 18 (1983).
112. Id. at 11, 18 (describing the “dispute pyramid” in which general disputes, disa-
greements, and injuries occupy the lower levels—those outside of the grasp of lawyers and
courts—and noting, as particularly applicable here, that “[m]ost of these disputes were settled
bilaterally, without the invocation of any third party”).
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pyramid, litigation consisting of case filings, settlements, trials,
and appeals.113
As a practical matter, the overwhelming majority of business dis-
putes are resolved without initiating formal legal proceedings.
Indeed, Dunworth and Rogers state that it is “reasonable ... to
assume that only a tiny fraction of contract disputes will generate
a court filing.”114 To be sure, informal dispute resolution will occur
“in the shadow of the law.”115 And tort claims, as contrasted to
contract claims, may be less susceptible to informal resolution if the
parties were strangers before the alleged tort occurred and will have
no continuing relationship going forward.116 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that a significant portion of the disputes likely to arise in
the course of a business will be resolved without recourse to courts
of any type, business or otherwise. This in turn gives businesses
further reason to discount the importance of business courts in
making their expansion decisions.
In summary, there is little reason to believe that the creation of
a business court is likely to have much of an impact on the incen-
tives of those individuals tasked with charting the expansion of an
out-of-state company’s business. Those incentives are, in the first
instance, likely to be shaped predominantly by economic consider-
ations rather than those related to the legal or regulatory environ-
ment.117 To the extent that legal considerations relating specifically
to dispute resolution factor into these decisions at all, they are likely
to be discounted because it is common at the outset of a business
venture to underestimate the likelihood of a future dispute.118 And
even if the company takes seriously the possibility of future
disputes, it will assume that, to the extent that these disputes arise
113. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in
U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 504 (1996); see also Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55,
63 (1963) (discussing factors in business which contribute to personnel performing properly).
114. Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 113, at 505.
115. See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982).
116. See id. (“At all levels of ... two business units personal relationships across the
boundaries of the two organizations exert pressures for conformity to expectations.”).
117. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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with individuals with whom the company has an ongoing relation-
ship, they are likely to be resolved informally, without resort to
formal litigation before any court, business or otherwise.119 The
cumulative effect of these arguments is to make the creation or
noncreation of a business court largely irrelevant to out-of-state
companies making expansion decisions.
B. Misalignment of Litigation Incentives
Even if one were to accept that dispute resolution procedures
generally play a more important role in location decisions than
suggested by the previous Section, it is still far from clear that
business courts are likely to influence the incentives of out-of-state
companies in a meaningful way. The reasons why become apparent
when one considers the dynamics that apply when an out-of-state
company is named as a defendant, on the one hand, and when that
same company files suit as a plaintiff, on the other.
Let us begin by considering the out-of-state company in its role as
defendant. Large businesses are much more likely to defend against
lawsuits than they are to initiate lawsuits against others.120 One
comprehensive study of litigation in federal court involving the two
thousand largest U.S. corporations between 1971 and 1991 found
that these companies appeared as a defendant in 74 percent of cases
and as a plaintiff in only 26 percent of cases.121 Given that the most
common litigation posture for large corporations is in the role of
defendant, one would think that the ability of a business court to
attract business to a particular state will turn primarily on an
assessment by an out-of-state company as to whether it is likely to
receive a fair hearing if it is named as a defendant. This is, however,
only partly correct. The threshold question in many instances is
whether the business court will even be able to hear the case.
As discussed above, all states that have created business courts
have imposed restrictions on the types of cases that they may
hear.122 The rules of the Birmingham Commercial Litigation Docket
119. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
120. See Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 113, at 540 (finding that for nearly all categories
of corporate cases, large companies were on the defendant’s side of the lawsuit).
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 16-17, 24-35 and accompanying text.
2012]   BUSINESS COURTS AND INTERSTATE COMPETITION 1947
in Alabama, for example, stipulate that the court may hear claims
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, securities claims, intellectual
property claims, and antitrust claims, among others.123 That court
is not authorized to hear product liability claims, whether brought
by individuals or as a class action; personal injury claims; or
individual employment-related claims.124
Using the numbers in the Dunworth and Rogers survey as a
rough proxy for litigation patterns generally, let us consider what
percentage of cases in which companies are named as defendants
the Birmingham Commercial Litigation Docket would be able to
hear.125 It would not have jurisdiction over civil rights suits—just
over 15 percent of the total—or product liability suits—almost 21
percent of the total. In other words, the business court would be
unable to hear approximately 36 percent of the cases that the
typical large corporation is likely to find itself defending as a
baseline. Even if one assumes that fully 70 percent of the remaining
tort and contract cases were eligible for resolution by the Alabama
business court—a heroic assumption in light of the eligibility
criteria outlined above—then the court will still be eligible to hear
fewer than 50 percent of the cases in which large companies are
typically named as defendants. One may fairly ask, therefore, how
likely it is that an out-of-state company will decide to expand into
a particular state on the basis of a dispute resolution body able to
hear less than one-half of the cases in which that company can
reasonably expect to be named as a defendant.126
Still another reason why a potential out-of-state defendant may
discount the salience of the business court is the availability of
alternative fora—specifically federal court and arbitration. Federal
diversity jurisdiction ensures that businesses incorporated in an-
123. J. Scott Vowell, Creation of Commercial Litigation Docket in the Birmingham Division,
Tenth Judicial Circuit, ALA. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 56, 57.
124. Id.
125. The above-quoted survey found that large U.S. corporations were named as defendants
in approximately 167,023 tort suits, 70,200 contract suits, and 52,223 civil rights suits
between 1971 and 1991. Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 113, at 541 tbl.7. Within the broader
category of tort suits, 72,035 were product liability suits. Id.
126. While these numbers may vary by industry, the aggregate data assembled by
Dunworth and Rogers covers the largest companies in the United States, spans a number of
industries, and therefore offers a useful overview of the incentives of businesses across the
board. See id. at 582-92 (listing the firms included in the study).
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other state are at least sometimes able to remove the action to
federal court in the event of litigation initiated in the host state.127
This forum is, significantly, able to hear both tort and contract
suits.128 And while federal courts are courts of general jurisdiction,
their availability means that out-of-state litigants often have at
least one alternative to litigating before a local trial judge who
knows little about business law.129 
Alternatively, out-of-state companies may also seek to resolve
their disputes via arbitration. To the extent that a company fears
that it will be forced to litigate claims brought by a party with which
it has a preexisting relationship in a forum not of its choosing, the
company can manage this risk by demanding that the other party
agree ex ante to binding arbitration in any disputes arising out of
their relationship. In so doing, the company can, in effect, create its
own private business court headed by one or more expert decision
makers to be jointly selected by the parties.130 Although arbitration
is, as a rule, less available in tort suits than in contract suits be-
cause tort plaintiffs are unlikely to consent to arbitration after the
fact of an unforeseen injury,131 the fact that arbitration exists as an
alternative in contract cases means, again, that out-of-state busi-
nesses, in their capacity as defendants, already have some ability to
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (providing federal district court jurisdiction for courts sitting
in diversity); id. § 1441 (allowing for removal to federal district courts).
128. See id. § 1441 (covering “any civil action,” a category in which both contract and tort
actions undoubtedly fall).
129. There is also a perception among some members of the bar that federal courts are
superior to state courts. See Daniel J. Meador, Essay, Transformation of the American
Judiciary, 46 ALA. L. REV. 763, 771 (1995). This may lead some lawyers to prefer to litigate
in federal court.
130. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher III, Learning to Live with the Federal Arbitration
Act—Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 123 n.135 (1988)
(observing that in arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, “[t]he arbitrators
are generally selected by the parties and in many cases are required to be neutral”). Delaware
even permits its chancellor and its vice chancellor to serve as arbitrators under some
circumstances. See Delaware Court of Chancery Adopts New Arbitration Rules, POTTER
ANDERSON & CORROON LLP (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.potteranderson.com/news/delaware-
court-of-chancery-adopts-new-arbitration-rules (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
131. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 2004, at
253, 255.
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avoid inexpert judges and master calendar systems at the state
level.132
Moreover, when the out-of-state company is litigating as a
plaintiff, the presence of a business court in a particular jurisdiction
should have no impact on any location decision. When an out-of-
state company initiates litigation as a plaintiff, it generally has the
power—subject to personal jurisdiction and venue constraints—to
choose the forum in which it wishes to bring suit.133 In these in-
stances, the fact that a state has a business court may well make
that state an attractive forum for the out-of-state company. The out-
of-state company will, however, typically be permitted to file suit in
that court regardless of whether it is doing business in the jurisdic-
tion.134 Accordingly, the presence or absence of a business court in
a particular jurisdiction must be viewed, from the perspective of a
potential plaintiff, as irrelevant to a decision to locate there.
In summary, a business court is unlikely to alter the actual in-
centives of out-of-state businesses’ expansion decisions because
these companies exhibit little demand for business courts in this
decision-making context. The multitude of other business factors
that typically dominate the expansion decision, combined with
(1) the contingent nature of litigation generally; (2) the fact that
most business disputes are resolved by means other than litigation;
(3) the restrictions on the type of cases that can be heard by the
typical business court; (4) the availability of federal court and
arbitration as alternatives to state court adjudication; and (5) the
fact that out-of-state companies may make use of the business court
as plaintiffs regardless of whether they are actually doing business
in the state, all suggest that the existence of the business court will
play a negligible role in expansion decisions. Accordingly, the claim
that the creation of a business court will encourage economic
development by attracting out-of-state companies to expand into the
132. While business courts are subsidized by the state, and therefore potentially less costly
than arbitration, the prevailing wisdom is that arbitration is—notwithstanding its costs—less
expensive than litigation. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES
AND PROBLEMS 27-28 (2d ed. 2006). But see Stipanowich, supra note 109, at 15 (suggesting
that “arbitration may be no less costly or lengthy than litigation”).
133. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(recognizing the “plaintiff’s power to choose the forum” as a factor to be weighed in the
personal jurisdiction analysis for bringing suits against a corporate defendant).
134. See sources cited supra notes 25-34.
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jurisdiction is not persuasive. The structural incentives for the
companies to respond to the newly supplied business courts—the
demand for the system of adjudicative services—are simply not
strong enough to alter their incentives in any meaningful way.
C. Business Courts as Branding Devices
Alternatively, one could argue that business courts attract
businesses to a particular jurisdiction not because they alter the
actual incentives of out-of-state companies but because they operate
to improve the business community’s perception of a state’s respon-
siveness to business concerns.135 On this account, the actual impact
of the business court on the actual incentives of businesses is
irrelevant. What matters is that the state successfully brands itself
as a place that is “business friendly;” so long as this branding effort
is viewed as successful, the business court project will be deemed a
success.136 As Peter Enrich has noted, this line of argument offers
two principal virtues from the perspective of the business advocate:
First, business advocates are in an unimpeachable position when
they say that a particular issue is critical to the business cli-
mate, because business climate is, by definition, what business
perceives it to be. Second, unlike claims about the [actual]
economic effects of determinate government actions, claims
about the significance of business climate are essentially imper-
vious to empirical verification or refutation, because business
climate defies objective measurement.137
Notwithstanding the cogency of these observations, the perception
argument fails to give enough credit to the fact that perception must
have some basis in reality. It is unlikely, for example, that an inno-
vation that had little or no impact on a company’s actual incentives
could produce a dramatic shift in perception. Even acknowledging
that the creation of a business court could result in a shift in
135. See, e.g., MD. BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 2 (“Maryland is still
generally perceived by the business community as anti-business. Whether accurate or not,
such perception is often viewed as reality.”).
136. For an excellent discussion of the dynamics of why politicians are as interested in the
symbolic content of their attempts to improve business climate as they are in its actual
causes, see Enrich, supra note 104, at 394. 
137. Id. at 394 n.83.
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perception that is outsized relative to the shift in actual incentives,
the impact on actual incentives in these cases is so minimal that the
change in perception is unlikely to be substantially greater. If there
is little or no demand for a product in a particular decision-making
context, it should not matter how it is branded. In order for this
argument to hold true, companies would have to take action based
on the mere perception of an improved business climate, irrespective
of any actual impact that the business court has on their incentives.
Because it seems unlikely that most rational companies would act
in this way when making major decisions about business expansion,
the perception argument does little to salvage the claim that busi-
ness courts will, in fact, succeed in attracting businesses from out-
of-state.
IV. COMPETING FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS
A second theory of economic competition relates to the competi-
tion among the states for corporate charters. For decades, corporate
law scholars have argued that states in general, and Delaware in
particular, seek to attract corporate chartering business from com-
panies in other states to obtain the franchise fees paid to the state
of incorporation.138 The existing literature shows that companies
tend to incorporate in their home state or in Delaware.139 To the
extent that a state business court is seeking to “compete” in this
arena, therefore, it is effectively competing with Delaware.140
Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters is frequently
attributed to the fact that its Court of Chancery generates and
draws upon a vast body of published case law, is staffed by judges
138. See, e.g., Stevelman, supra note 11, at 59 (noting that in Delaware, “selling corporate
charters can generate as much as $600 million or more,” which accounts for “about one-fifth
of the state’s total annual tax revenue”); see also MD. BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, supra
note 23, at 21 (noting the Business Law Section of the Maryland Bar Association assertion
that “the establishment of a [business court] ... could increase the number of business entities
incorporated ... in Maryland which improves the state’s overall economy”).
139. See Daines, supra note 7, at 1572.
140. The fact that a majority of the largest public companies are incorporated in Delaware
suggests that corporations do demand a stable system of corporate law rules to govern their
internal affairs. See Stevelman, supra note 11, at 59-60; see also Marcel Kahan, The Demand
for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 340, 341 (2006) (“We also find significant but less robust evidence that firms
are more likely to incorporate in states with higher quality judicial systems.”).
1952 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1915
with considerable expertise in corporate law, and has a reputation
for expeditious resolution of cases.141 This court hears all cases in
equity (i.e., without a jury) and hears primarily corporate, as
opposed to commercial, cases.142 Were other states to create similar
courts, then there is a possibility that they could attract charters
away from Delaware.143 The question is whether these other states
are willing and able to supply courts that are likely to compete
successfully with the Court of Chancery.
Although the competition for corporate charters rationale is
invoked less frequently than the attracting business rationale, a
number of commentators have cited it as a rationale for creating
business courts.144 There is, moreover, some evidence that states
create business courts in order to attract corporations.145 The
Nevada Secretary of State, for example, advertises that state’s bus-
iness court as a reason to incorporate in Nevada in that it “mini-
mizes the time, costs and risks of commercial litigation.”146
141. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 95, at 776-79.
142. Id. at 773; Nees, supra note 1, at 480-81 (“The Chancery Court retained the old
English distinctions between law and equity.... [It] hears cases involving breach of fiduciary
duties, ... class actions, [and] shareholder disputes [among others].”); see also supra notes 28-
29.
143. There are, however, no guarantees. The Court of Chancery is only a part of a package
of attributes deemed to make Delaware a desirable place to incorporate. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR.,
WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1-2 (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/
whycorporations_web.pdf (discussing the importance of the Court of Chancery).
144. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 5, at 1837 (“In trying to attract incorporation business,
states may create courts of specialized jurisdiction that appeal to business managers and
investors.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor
Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 505 (2000) (“If non-Delaware attorneys wanted to
compete with Delaware's dominance in the corporate chartering business, ... these attorneys
should be lobbying their state legislatures to develop specialized business courts to compete
with Delaware’s.”); Nees, supra note 1, at 491 (“Attracting business in the form of corporate
registrations ... is a secondary purpose of creating specialized business courts.”); see also MD.
BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 21 (“The Business Law Section further
contends that the establishment of a Business and Technology Division within the State
Circuit Court System could increase the number of business entities incorporated and
headquartered in Maryland.”).
145. See, e.g., Jack Scism, Greensboro Lawyer Gets New Business Judgeship, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Jan. 16, 1996, at B5, available at 1996 WLNR 5834389
(quoting a state legislative commission study’s finding that the “lack of a business court ...
puts North Carolina at a disadvantage when corporations are considering states in which to
incorporate to do business”).
146. The Nevada Advantage, NEV. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://nvsos.gov/index.aspx?page=422
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012). In light of this stated goal, it is peculiar that Nevada does not
require its business court to publish its decisions. See Jesse N. Panoff, Why State Trial Court
2012]   BUSINESS COURTS AND INTERSTATE COMPETITION 1953
The best explanation for why the current crop of business courts
is ill-equipped to compete successfully with the courts in Delaware
is set forth in Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar’s seminal article on
the myth of state competition for corporate charters.147 In this
article, Kahan and Kamar argue that although the potential exists
for states to compete with Delaware for chartering business, there
is little evidence that these states are actually engaged in a process
of competition.148 In advancing this argument, they specifically
consider—and reject—the claim that the creation of business courts
by other states represents an attempt to compete with the Delaware
Court of Chancery.149 In so doing, they outline four arguments why
this is so.
First, whereas the Court of Chancery hears primarily corporate
cases involving disputes between shareholders, directors, and
officers, business courts outside of Delaware are typically called
upon to adjudicate cases covering the entire panoply of business
law, including corporate law.150 This expansive jurisdictional focus
suggests that these courts were not designed primarily to attract
incorporations.151 If this was the goal, then one would expect these
courts to have a jurisdictional ambit more narrowly targeted on
corporate law—that is, the law that is most relevant to companies
considering whether to reincorporate under the law of another state.
They do not.152
Second, whereas the Court of Chancery sits in equity and hears
all cases without a jury, business courts outside of Delaware retain
Judges Should Write Their Own Decisions: Transforming the Current System, 51 S. TEX. L.
REV. 307, 324 (2009) (discussing an unenacted legislative proposal that would “require
business court judges [in Nevada] to write and publish their decisions”); Brian G. Anderson,
Nevada: (Not Yet) The Delaware of the West, SANTORO, DRIGGS, WALCH, KEARNEY, HOLLEY &
THOMPSON (on file with the William and Mary Law Review) (observing that until the Nevada
business court starts publishing its opinions, it is unlikely to mount a serious challenge to
Delaware).
147. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 708-15, 724-35 (2002).
148. Id. at 701-24.
149. Id. at 708-15.
150. Id. at 711 tbl.4, 712; see supra notes 28-29 (distinguishing “corporate” and
“commercial” law).
151. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 712 (“As in the case of New York, the purpose
of these courts was to streamline the disposition of commercial cases, not to attract
incorporations.”).
152. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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juries to hear cases that would ordinarily be submitted to a jury in
the absence of a business court.153 Corporate litigants would, all
things being equal, prefer to litigate intracorporate disputes before
a judge instead of a jury; this is frequently mentioned as one of the
reasons why businesses prefer to litigate in Delaware.154 Because
states that create business courts have chosen to retain juries, this
choice suggests that these business courts are not being created
with the goal of attracting incorporation business away from
Delaware.155
Third, whereas all decisions by the Court of Chancery are duly
published in the relevant reporters and in online databases, many
business courts outside of Delaware did not, at least as of 2002,
publish their opinions at all.156 This failure to take active steps to
generate and promulgate a coherent body of corporate case law fur-
ther suggests that business courts were not primarily intended to
attract incorporations. 
Finally, many states that have established business courts have
chosen not to enact statutes requiring that directors of corporations
organized under that state’s law consent to being sued in that state
for breach of fiduciary duty, as Delaware does.157 In the absence of
such a statute, it is unclear whether a business court would be able
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a director whose company was
incorporated in the same state but headquartered elsewhere. If a
court designed to attract incorporation business lacks personal
jurisdiction over the individuals who are most frequently named as
defendants in intracorporate litigation, then the existence of that
court is unlikely to factor into incorporation decisions. The company
153. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 711 tbl.4.
154. J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and the Delaware
Uniform Contribution Act, 11 DEL. L. REV. 71, 96 n.146 (2010) (noting that “corporate and
director defendants generally prefer the Court of Chancery for the experience of its judges in
corporate disputes, lack of a jury, and inability to award punitive damages” (emphasis
added)).
155. These states may in some cases face state constitutional constraints on their ability
to do away with jury trials. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. 23 (West, Westlaw through 2010
amendments) (“The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several
Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $15,000,
shall be inviolably preserved.”).
156. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 711 tbl.4.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2002); see, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at
714 (noting that Nevada “does not require directors of domestic corporations to consent to
being sued in the State for breaches of their fiduciary duties”).
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would simply assume that shareholder derivative lawsuits would be
filed elsewhere, and could discount the importance of a particular
state’s business court.
In light of the foregoing analysis, Kahan and Kamar concluded
that the primary purpose of the business courts was to streamline
commercial litigation, not to compete with Delaware to attract
corporate charters.158 Although their article was published in 2002,
little has changed over the past ten years that would affect their
conclusions. The business courts created over the past decade, like
those that came before them, are typically assigned to hear cases
covering the entire panoply of business law and do not focus solely
on corporate law.159 These newly created courts will try cases to a
jury, unless the litigants specifically waive this right.160 States that
have created business courts still do not require that nonresident
directors consent to jurisdiction. In many respects, then, little has
changed.
The one area in which Kahan and Kamar’s analysis is somewhat
outdated relates to opinion publication practices. As shown in Table
1, more business court opinions are published today in reporters
such as Lexis or Westlaw than was the case in 2002.161 Those cases
that are not published on Lexis or Westlaw are often made available
on court websites.162 Notwithstanding the increased availability of
business court decisions generally, the core critique leveled by
Kahan and Kamar still stands. While these published opinions may
offer useful insights into commercial law, and while they may
provide valuable certainty as to the content of a particular state’s
commercial law, their focus is broadly targeted on business law
rather than corporate law. In addition, making cases available on a
158. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 715. Notwithstanding this conclusion, Kahan and
Kamar make clear that the field is open to states that wish to compete in this market: “[I]t
is entirely plausible that an enterprising governor will in the future revamp her state’s
corporate law, establish a specialized court, and go after a portion of Delaware’s profits.” Id.
at 725.
159. See supra Part I; see also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 711 tbl.4. 
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. See infra Table I.
162. See, e.g., First Judicial Dist. of Pa., Commerce Program Index of Opinions,
PHILADELPHIA COURTS, http://www.courts.phila.gov/apps/opinions/courtsearch.asp?search
=cptcvcom; see also Kali Wyrosdic, Commerce Court, 10 Years Later, PHILA. BUS. J., Dec. 17,
2010, http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/print-edition/2010/12/17/commerce-court-10-
years-later.html?page=all.
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state website that is not searchable, which is currently the norm in
a number of states,163 is of little value to commercial actors or other
counsel.164 Accordingly, the availability of these opinions does little
to bolster the claim that business courts are being created to
compete with Delaware for corporate charters. 
None of this is to say that business courts are incapable of
attracting corporate charters to a jurisdiction. Rather, it is simply
to note that as currently comprised, these courts are unlikely to do
so. If states were to make changes to their business courts to make
them more like the Court of Chancery, then there is a chance that
they could attract incorporation business. To date, however, few
states have made any serious moves to model their business courts
along these lines.
163. See infra Table I.
164. When opinions are not published at all, the loss to the commercial community is
obvious. When opinions are published seriatim on a state court website that is not searchable,
then the loss is comparable. In today’s world, an opinion that is not searchable does not exist
for all practical purposes. In order for business courts to fulfill their core function of providing
greater certainty about the content of the business law of a particular state, it is necessary
not simply that they write opinions but also—as importantly—that the state invest the time
and resources in making sure that these opinions circulate as widely as possible. This means
investing a sufficient amount in information technology to guarantee that these decisions can
be located, searched, and read by local attorneys.
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V. COMPETING FOR LITIGATION BUSINESS
A third theory is that business courts represent an attempt by
states to compete for litigation business.165 On this account, local
lawyers seek to persuade state officials to make their home
jurisdiction a more attractive place to litigate disputes by establish-
ing business courts. To the extent that litigants have a choice be-
tween litigating in one forum over another, those litigants will
prefer the forum that has a business court to one that does not. The
intended effect is to divert legal business away from states without
business courts and to states with them, which in turn generates
business for local lawyers.166
The notion of attracting, or retaining, litigation business to (or
within) a particular jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the
notion of attracting or retaining regular business. As outlined above,
a state successfully attracts or retains regular business when it
adopts policies that affect location decisions.167 If these policies suc-
ceed in persuading businesses to locate stores, factories, or offices
in a particular state, then they have succeeded in attracting or
retaining regular business. By comparison, a state successfully
attracts or retains litigation business by adopting policies that make
it more likely that businesses will litigate their disputes in that
state’s courts.168
165. Other scholars have described this competition for legal business as a “market for
contracts” in which states “actively compete[ ] in an interstate market for corporate contracts.”
Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2073. Miller and Eisenberg acknowledge, however, that
“[a]ttracting contracts ... increases demand for the services of [local] attorneys,” id. at 2074,
that lawyers in New York lobbied for laws that would enforce arbitration clauses in
commercial contracts because they “perceived a potentially valuable source of future
business,” id. at 2087, and that states “compete for litigation ... by offering upgraded judicial
services to major commercial parties,” id. at 2092. The market for contracts can thus be
viewed as a competition among lawyers in different states to compete for litigation and other
legal business.
166. See Haig, supra note 44, at 192 n.4 (referring to “the competition among states for
business litigation”).
167. See supra Part III.
168. In some cases, out-of-state companies may need to obtain a certificate of authority to
file suit. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-02(a) (2010) (“No foreign corporation transacting
business in this State without permission obtained through a certificate of authority ... shall
be permitted to maintain any action or proceeding in any court of this State.”).
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In many quarters, the suggestion that a particular innovation will
bring more litigation business to a particular jurisdiction is viewed
as distasteful.169 To be sure, there are some exceptions. The capacity
of a business court to generate business for in-state lawyers was
openly acknowledged as a reason to create and maintain the
Commercial Division in New York. An official body tasked with
evaluating the performance of that business court noted approvingly
that it had “helped to stem the flight of commercial litigants from
New York’s courts.”170 One occasionally sees isolated statements to
this effect in other states as well.171 On the whole, however, this
particular competition-based rationale is only rarely invoked as a
reason to create a business court.
This Part first observes that business courts do, in fact, have the
capacity to divert litigation business from one state to another. In
this respect, they can play a role in interstate competition for
economic resources. This Part describes a well-publicized example
of such business being diverted to the North Carolina Business
Court. It goes on to argue, however, that the scope for diversion is
limited by a number of factors that impose meaningful constraints
on the ability of a business court to attract out-of-state litigation
business.
A. The Diversion of Legal Business Occurs
A classic example of how a business court can divert litigation
business away from another jurisdiction is the dispute arising out
of the merger between Wachovia and First Union in North
Carolina.172 On April 16, 2001, Wachovia and First Union, both
169. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 365 (2008) (suggesting that “[c]ompetition among states
to attract litigation business may not be ... healthy”); Editorial, The ‘Judicial Hellhole,’ CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 11, 2004, at C22 (“In a perverse way, Madison County attracts business—legal
business. Class-action lawyers flock there to file lawsuits.”).
170. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL ADMIN., THE CHIEF JUDGE’S COURT
RESTRUCTURING PLAN, WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS, SHOULD BE ADOPTED (1997), available
at http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/show_html_new.php?rid=46.
171. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
172. See David Boraks, In Battle for Wachovia, Many Suits, Many Goals, AM. BANKER, June
4, 2001, at 11. For a detailed discussion of the background behind this merger, see Lijun K.
Yang, Note, First Union v. SunTrust Banks: The Fight for Wachovia and Its Impact on North
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North Carolina banks, announced plans for a friendly merger.173
One month later, SunTrust, a Georgia bank, launched a hostile bid
to acquire Wachovia.174 A flurry of lawsuits followed. On May 22,
First Union filed a lawsuit against SunTrust in North Carolina
Superior Court.175 On that same day, SunTrust filed a lawsuit
against First Union and Wachovia in federal district court in
Georgia.176 On May 23, SunTrust filed a lawsuit against First Union
and Wachovia in Georgia Superior Court.177 Faced with the prospect
of litigating their disputes in three different courts across two
states, the principals agreed on June 1 to transfer all pending liti-
gation between them—including the two cases SunTrust brought in
Georgia—to the North Carolina Business Court.178
Why did the parties agree to transfer the entirety of the pending
litigation to this particular court? One of the North Carolina
lawyers who represented First Union subsequently offered a partial
explanation:
Carolina Corporate Law, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 335 (2002). 
173. Riva D. Atlas, SunTrust Makes Bid for Wachovia, Criticizing First Union’s Offer, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/15/business/suntrust-makes-bid-for-
wachovia-criticizing-first-union-s-offer.html.
174. Id.
175. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686, at
*30 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001). This suit alleged unfair trade practices and tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage and sought a declaratory judgment that
certain stock option agreements were valid and enforceable. Id. Wachovia subsequently joined
the lawsuit on the side of First Union. Id. On May 25, 2001, SunTrust effected removal of the
North Carolina state action to the federal court in North Carolina. First Union Corp., Pre-
Effective Amendment to Registration of Securities Issued in a Business-Combination
Transaction (Form S-4/A), at 171 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter First Union Corp. Form S-4/A].
Six days later, on May 31, the federal court remanded the action to the North Carolina courts,
citing a lack of diversity jurisdiction. Id.
176. First Union Corp. Form S-4/A, supra note 175, at 171. SunTrust’s federal suit alleged
that First Union and Wachovia filed a joint preliminary proxy statement containing
“materially false and misleading statement in violation of the federal securities laws.” Id. This
suit alleged “that the stock option agreements between First Union and Wachovia contained
certain excessive provisions, particularly in relation to the cap on the total profit that may be
obtained upon exercise of [an] option” to receive common stock. First Union Corp., 2001 WL
1885686, at *30. In addition, this suit alleged that Wachovia’s directors had breached their
fiduciary duties and that First Union had aided and abetted these breaches. First Union Corp.
Form S-4/A, supra note 175, at 172. The suit also asserted a claim for restraint of trade. Id.
177. First Union Corp., 2001 WL 1885686, at *30.
178. First Union Corp. Form S-4/A, supra note 175, at 171.
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[W]hen we agreed to go into Business Court, that put the
litigation in a court with a judge who understood the issues and
could deal with them expeditiously, and according to a procedure
that accommodated the very short time frame within which it
played out.... If it had gone into [regular] state court here [in
North Carolina], they would not have been set up properly for
the complicated legal issues of merger and acquisitions that had
to be decided on a very tight schedule. And in a regular court
system, you would have had a different judge for each phase of
the litigation.179
There was, in short, demand for quick and expert dispute resolution
services on the part of both the in-state and out-of-state parties
involved in the litigation.180 The North Carolina Business Court
satisfied that demand, and—significantly—Georgia lacked a busi-
ness court at the time.181
In the litigation before the North Carolina Business Court,
SunTrust was represented by two North Carolina-based law firms,
four North Carolina-based lawyers, one New York-based law firm,
four New York-based attorneys, and one Delaware-based attor-
ney.182 First Union and Wachovia were collectively represented by
three North Carolina-based law firms, eleven North Carolina-based
lawyers, two New York-based law firms, seven New York-based
lawyers, and two California-based lawyers.183 Notwithstanding the
fact that SunTrust was incorporated in Georgia,184 was head-
quartered in Georgia, and had filed two suits in Georgia against
179. Michael Dayton, Trend: Speciality Business Courts on the Rise, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Mar.
22, 2004 (quoting corporate lawyer Russell M. Robinson II).
180. See id. (noting that Robinson believed “the merger [likely] would not have taken place”
without resort to the business court).
181. See id. (reporting that the general counsel for SunTrust working in Atlanta stated that
he “came back from North Carolina with the conviction that Georgia should have a business
court”).
182. See First Union Corp., 2001 WL 1885686, at *39 (refusing to enforce a nontermination
provision in a merger agreement); First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-
10075, 2001 WL 1885687, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 26, 2001) (resolving the remaining state
law claims).
183. See sources cited supra note 182.
184. SUNTRUST BANKS, INC., ARTICLES OF RESTATEMENT OF THE ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.suntrust.com (follow “Site Map”; then follow
“About Us”; then follow “Corporate Governance” to “Corporate Governance Documents” to
“Articles of Incorporation”).
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First Union and Wachovia,185 there were no Georgia lawyers among
those attorneys listed in the North Carolina Business Court’s final
opinion. The litigation business arising out of the dispute, in other
words, went to non-Georgia lawyers.
This did not go unnoticed in Georgia legal circles. As a past
president of the Georgia bar put it: “We flat out lost a significant
amount of legal business to a neighboring state.... There would have
been a lot of lawyers involved here [in Georgia] if the litigation had
stayed here.”186 In the years that followed, the Georgia bar began
lobbying state officials to create a business court in Georgia.187
These lawyers cited the impressive performance of the North
Carolina Business Court in the course of the Wachovia litigation as
a rationale for establishing such a court in Georgia, as well as the
argument that such a court would result in more efficient resolution
of complex business cases.188 In October 2005, Georgia established
the Fulton County Superior Court Business Court.189 In the years
since, there have been no published reports of Georgia losing
litigation business arising out of complex business disputes to other
states.
B. But There Are Limits on Its Scope
The above example serves to highlight the fact that business
courts can divert legal business away from other states. However,
it also illustrates some of the limits of the potential diversion. First,
in order for litigation business to be diverted, one of the parties to
the dispute must be from out of state. If the parties both reside in
185. See First Union Corp. Form S-4/A, supra note 175, at 171-72.
186. Rachel Tobin Ramos, Business Court May Start Here as Pilot Project, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON., Oct. 8, 2004, at A3 (quoting Bill Barwick, Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan
LLP).
187. See Kirsten Tagami, Open for Business: New Fast Track Fulton Court Tries to Fill a
Niche, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 12, 2006, at 1F. This drive was clearly based in part on
genuine admiration for how the North Carolina Business Court operated. See id.; see also
Dayton, supra note 179.
188. See Tom Barry, Court’s Business Division Gives Cases Needed TLC, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON., May 18, 2007, at C14 (noting that the business court had the support of SunTrust’s
general counsel, who was impressed by the North Carolina Business Court during the
Wachovia litigation).
189. Id.
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the same jurisdiction, it is highly unlikely that they would want to
litigate their dispute in a different jurisdiction. Second, there must
be multiple fora where personal jurisdiction can be obtained over
the defendant. If a business court lacks personal jurisdiction over a
particular defendant, diversion to that business court cannot occur.
Third, the parties must either agree by contract, ex ante or ex
post, to transfer all pending litigation to the business court, or the
party that wants to litigate before the business court must win the
race to the courthouse.190 If the out-of-state party loses the race to
the courthouse, or if the opposing party refuses to agree to transfer
the case, then diversion cannot occur. Fourth, the competitor state
must lack a business court. As more states establish business
courts, the opportunities for diversion attributable to the creation
of a business court should decline. Fifth, the case must qualify as a
“business” dispute within the rules of the relevant business court.191
Corporate disputes like the one between First Union, Wachovia, and
SunTrust are thus capable of being diverted. Claims for personal
injury and products liability, by comparison, are not.192 Finally, the
suit must comply with any local rules relating to venue.193
Although disputes that satisfy all six of these criteria—an out-of-
state party, multiple fora with personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant, mutual agreement as to the forum or a successful race to the
courthouse, a lack of a business court in the other state, a claim
eligible to be heard by a business court, and proper venue—are not
unheard of, such a combination is likely not the norm. Given the
atypical character of such cases, it is open to question whether the
size and scale of litigation business capable of being diverted from
one state court to another is significant.
These limitations notwithstanding, it is ironic that the most
plausible of the three competition-based arguments in support of
establishing business courts—that these courts will generate busi-
ness for local lawyers194—is also the argument that is least likely to
190. If one is defending a suit, it is obviously much more difficult to control the choice of
forum, though one can remove to federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006), or invoke an
arbitration or forum selection clause in the contract. 
191. See supra notes 16-17, 24-31 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
194. See supra Part II.B.
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generate political support for these courts.195 Nevertheless, the
analysis in the preceding three Parts suggests that business courts
are unlikely to attract business to a jurisdiction under any circum-
stances and are unlikely, as currently comprised, to attract incor-
poration business. The analysis also suggests that while these
courts have attracted litigation business to the jurisdictions that
create them, there are limits on the potential scope of such diver-
sion. All of these conclusions bear directly on the question of how
future business courts should be designed, a topic that is addressed
in the next Part.
C. A Response to a Possible Counterargument
As a prelude to considering the design issue it is necessary to
briefly consider a counterargument to the claim that competition-
based arguments are of only limited utility when it comes to jus-
tifying the creation of a business court. This is the argument that
the very fact that business courts have been widely adopted is
evidence that the process of economic competition must be driving
their creation. It is widely accepted, after all, that such competition
can play an important role in ensuring that a particular innovation
becomes widely diffused across the states.196 Indeed, some scholars
have argued that precisely this process explains the spread of the
business court.197 If this is so, then how can this be reconciled with
the arguments set forth in the previous three Parts, which express
considerable skepticism as to the plausibility of at least two of the
three possible competition-based rationales?
To be clear, I am not arguing that notions of interjurisdictional
competition played no role in driving the creation of business courts.
The claim that a business court will enable a state to compete more
effectively with other states carries considerable rhetorical weight
and, consequently, influenced state officials, lobbyists, and power
brokers across the United States deciding whether to establish a
business court, as evidenced by their contemporaneous state-
195. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
196. See Boehmke & Witmer, supra note 39, at 39-40.
197. BAUM, supra note 4, at 193 (“Business courts ... reflect competition as a mechanism
for the diffusion of innovations.”).
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ments.198 The fact that an argument is rhetorically effective,
however, does not mean that the underlying merits of the argument
are sound.199 It is perfectly consistent to argue that competition-
based arguments played a role in driving the creation of business
courts while simultaneously arguing that that the logic underlying
these arguments is flawed.
While it is well beyond the scope of this Article to offer a compre-
hensive alternative account of the rise of the business court, it is
worth noting there are plausible, non-competition-based explana-
tions for this phenomenon. Indeed, there exists an entire branch of
sociological institutional theory200 premised on the notion that the
diffusion of legal and institutional innovations can take place
through a process other than one of competition for economic
resources.201 This theory—which some sociologists have labeled
“institutional isomorphism”—posits that organizations may adopt
institutional innovations previously adopted by other organizations
for a number of reasons.202 These reasons include outside pressure,
198. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
199. This is not to suggest that business court advocates are being disingenuous; there is
little question that these arguments were advanced in good faith. Rather, it is simply to note
that even justifications that have a great deal of surface appeal may not always be sound.
200. Institutional theory is that branch of sociology that “examines the processes and
mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules, and routines become established as
authoritative guidelines for social behavior.” W. Richard Scott, Institutional Theory, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY 408, 408 (George Ritzer ed., 2005); see also Boehmke &
Witmer, supra note 39, at 39 (discussing the expansion of policy within a state).
201. A sub-branch of institutional theory known as neo-institutional theory posits that “the
adoption and diffusion of changes occur in organizations for reasons beyond the invisible hand
of market efficiency.” Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps Its Wings in Menlo Park: An
Organizational Analysis of Increases in Associate Salaries, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 713, 716.
202. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150-
54 (1983) (rejecting the idea that organizational change is driven exclusively by economic
competition and arguing instead that such change can occur, for example, as a result of a
desire to obtain institutional legitimacy). This concept has been used to explain the spread
of drug courts across the United States, see Roger E. Hartley & James W. Douglas,
Isomorphism and Policy Diffusion in Local Jurisdictions: Explaining the Spread of Drug
Courts Across Four States 32-33 (Oct. 6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.pmranet.org/conferences/AZU2007/ArizonaPapers/Hartley_&_Douglas_2007.pdf,
the structure of national security courts, see Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and
Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 967, 970-86 (2009), and the reasons why large
corporations tend to adopt the same institutional arrangements following the passage of
antidiscrimination laws, see Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1531 (1992). See generally
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a desire to obtain formal legitimacy, and the influence of formal
education and professional networks in disseminating ideas.203 On
a more intuitive level, it seems clear that while legal and institu-
tional innovations can arise out of a competitive process between
states, it does not follow automatically that widely copied innova-
tions result from such a process.204 Forty-nine of the fifty states have
a bicameral legislature,205 but nobody would seriously argue that
this outcome is the product of economic competition between the
states. 
D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009)
(discussing insights to be drawn from institutional theory).
203. See Dimaggio & Powell, supra note 202, at 150-53. Institutional isomorphic change
can occur through three distinct mechanisms. The first, “coercive isomorphism,” results from
“formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which
they are dependent.” Id. at 150. The second, “mimetic isomorphism,” is the result of insti-
tutional change undertaken in the face of uncertainty. Id. at 151. The third, “normative
isomorphism,” results from contacts and connections arising out of formal education and
professional networks. Id. at 152. Over the past two decades, the framework outlined above
has been used to explain the similarities in organizational structure in nonprofit organ-
izations (art museums) and for-profit organizations (law firms). See Peter Frumkin & Joseph
Galaskiewicz, Institutional Isomorphism and Public Sector Organizations, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 283, 283-84 (2004). Legitimacy in this context refers to “the degree of cultural
support for an organization.” John W. Meyer & W. Richard Scott, Centralization and the
Legitimacy Problems of Local Government, in ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RATIONAL AND
RATIONALITY 199, 201 (John W. Meyer & W. Richard Scott eds., 2d ed. 1992); see also Cathryn
Johnson et al., Legitimacy as a Social Process, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 53, 55-57 (2006) (discussing
definitions of legitimacy in institutional theory); Mark S. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy:
Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995) (defining
legitimacy to mean “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values,
beliefs, and definitions”).
204. One must also be cautious before attributing to public sector officials the same
motivations and decision-making processes that are frequently attributed to private sector
actors. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of
Policy Innovations, 29 AM. POL. RES. 221, 221-22 (2001) (observing that state officials
“typically do not engage in rational, comprehensive decision making,” but rather “take cues
from innovative states that have successfully addressed the problem”); Jack L. Walker, The
Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880, 889 (1969)
(observing that when it comes to the adoption of institutional innovations, state officials
“make most of their decisions by analogy”); see also Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, supra note 203,
at 283 (observing that “new institutionalism” has “moved research away from overly
rationalistic explanations of organizational behavior”).
205. Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral legislature. See Robert F. Blomquist, The
Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 895, 896 (2005).
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There are, in short, other plausible, non-competition-based the-
ories that may explain the spread of the business courts that are
unrelated to theories of economic competition.206 Hence, the mere
fact that business courts have been so widely adopted does not by
itself undermine the claims that business courts are unlikely to
attract business to a jurisdiction and are unlikely to attract incor-
poration business. Nor does it require us to reconsider the claim
that while these courts can attract, and have attracted, litigation
business to the jurisdiction that creates them, there are limits on
the potential scope of such diversion. With these insights in mind,
let us now turn to the question of institutional design.
VI. LESSONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The foregoing analysis has a number of implications for state
officials considering how best to design a business court. First, the
goal of attracting and retaining business is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of business court design. To the extent that any particular
design element is intended specifically to attract or retain business,
it should be omitted unless there is an alternative justification
for its inclusion. Second, unless the basic institutional structure of
the business court is substantially revised, then such courts are
exceedingly unlikely to attract incorporation business away from
Delaware. Third, if such courts are to be used to attract litigation
business, states should consider adopting a number of additional
innovations in order to maximize the success of this endeavor. At
the same time, however, states should question whether the cost of
adopting these innovations is worth the benefits that the state can
206. In this context, it is instructive that at least two scholars have argued that the
proliferation of another type of specialized court at the state level—drug courts—has been
driven primarily by isomorphic forces rather than by economic competition. See Hartley &
Douglas, supra note 202, at 32-33 (arguing that a combination of state mandates, oppor-
tunities to observe other drug courts in operation, and exposure to the idea at professional
conferences led to widespread institutional reforms within the state court systems relating
to the treatment of drug-related offenses). For other examples of this phenomenon in action,
see Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to
Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 493, 493 (2006); Edelman, supra note
202, at 1531-32; Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local
Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime,
39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 893, 903 (2005).
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expect to derive from them. Fourth, and finally, should states choose
to design future business courts without regard to competition-
based arguments, they should focus their attention on the need to
design institutions that improve the quality of decision making and
maximize administrative efficiency. These general conclusions give
rise to a number of specific recommendations.
A. Rethinking Technology Courts
Several states have considered creating business courts that have
a special focus on technology issues. Maryland has actually created
such a court—the Business and Technology Case Management
Program—and Michigan has seriously considered the idea.207 These
courts can be distinguished from other business courts in that the
case assignment criteria make specific reference to technology cases
and the judges are given special training in resolving technology
disputes.208 Significantly, this expertise is in addition to, rather than
in place of, their expertise in business law generally.209
While virtually every business court is said to attract business to
a specific state, this particular rationale has increased salience in
the context of business and technology courts. Advocates for these
courts contend that they will attract not just any business but a
particular type of business—technology companies—to the state
that creates them.210 If the notion is insupportable—and the anal-
ysis set forth above suggests that it is—then the case for creating
business and technology courts must be reconsidered. Although such
courts may be effective at attracting litigation business from tech-
nology companies, a possibility discussed at greater length below,211
it is highly unlikely that these courts will induce such companies
to locate in a particular jurisdiction.212 Thus, to the extent that
207. See Sommer, supra note 79, at 575, 580.
208. See, e.g., id. at 577-78.
209. See id. at 577.
210. See MD. BUS. & TECH. COURT TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that the
proposal to create a business and technology court was part of an “overall plan to encourage
technology companies to locate in the State”); Sommer, supra note 79, at 603-09 (discussing
efforts by Maryland and Michigan to attract high tech businesses to their states by creating
business courts).
211. See infra Part VI.C.
212. See supra Part III.A.
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technology court advocates have suggested that these courts may
attract high tech companies to their home states, their arguments
are based on a faulty premise.
With respect to attracting corporate charters, the likelihood that
creating a business and technology court will enable the state that
creates it to compete more effectively with Delaware dropped pre-
cipitously in 2003. This was the year when Delaware, in direct re-
sponse to the creation of the Business and Technology Case
Management Program in Maryland, altered its rules to allow the
Court of Chancery to adjudicate technology disputes.213 In light of
the myriad other advantages currently enjoyed by Delaware with
respect to the market for corporate charters,214 it seems highly
unlikely today that a state that simply created a business and tech-
nology court would succeed in attracting incorporation business
away from Delaware.
B. Breaking Delaware’s Dominance
If a state’s goal is to use a business court to attract incorporation
business, as is the case in Nevada,215 then it must completely re-
vamp the structure of the modern business court. To date, such
courts have been assigned cases across the entire panoply of cor-
porate and commercial law, retained jury trials, published their
opinions primarily on state court websites, and declined to enact
statutes requiring that directors of corporations organized under
that state’s law consent to being sued in that state.216 If such courts
are to compete with the Court of Chancery, then state officials
creating them would be well advised to assign them corporate law
cases primarily or exclusively, allow for more bench trials, publish
more of their opinions in online repositories like Lexis and Westlaw,
and enact statutes requiring that directors of corporations organized
under that state’s law consent to being sued in that state. Until
213. See Holland, supra note 94, at 773 (“In 2003, the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
was expanded by statute to include adjudication of technology disputes that arise out of
agreements involving at least one Delaware business entity, even if they concern solely claims
for [money] damages.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
215. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 147, at 712.
216. See supra notes 147-57; see also Sommer, supra note 79, at 571.
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these basic design elements are changed, it is highly unlikely that
the court will succeed in attracting incorporation business to a
particular jurisdiction. 
Even if an enterprising state were to adopt these design elements,
however, it is still not clear that it would make a difference.
Delaware’s success is attributable not just to its Court of Chancery,
but to an entire package of attributes that includes steady and ro-
bust support for the project of attracting corporate charters across
all branches of state government, a reputation developed over
decades, and a vast body of corporate case law that provides cer-
tainty to corporate actors and their attorneys.217 Other states will be
hard pressed to match these advantages, even assuming that
another state chose to make a run at Delaware by remaking its
business court to resemble the Court of Chancery. And if another
state were to pioneer an institutional innovation with any potential
to attract incorporation business away from Delaware, one can be
confident that Delaware will quickly copy that innovation. As noted
previously, Delaware changed its rules in 2003 to allow the Court
of Chancery to hear certain technology cases in response to innova-
tions in Maryland.218 In 2010, the Delaware Superior Court created
a separate business court, the Complex Commercial Litigation
Division, in response to the spread of business courts in neighboring
states.219 The possibility that Delaware will copy any particular
innovation in this area is thus likely to dampen any other state’s
enthusiasm for institutional reforms designed to attract incorpora-
tion business.
217. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 210-11 (2011) (discussing
various attributes that make Delaware an attractive place to incorporate); see also DEL. DIV.
OF CORPS., ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009) (noting that “[b]usinesses choose Delaware not for one
single reason, but because we provide a complete package of incorporation services” including
the expert Chancery Court and “prompt, friendly, and professional [administrative]
service[s]”).
218. See Holland, supra note 94, at 773.
219. See COMMERCIAL LITIGATION ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE, supra note 30, at 1.
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C. Innovating to Attract Litigation Business
There is some evidence that business courts, as currently com-
prised, have the capacity to attract litigation business.220 There are
a number of institutional innovations that, if adopted by a particu-
lar state, could increase the likelihood that a particular court will be
successful in attracting such business. A number of these policy
options are listed below, arranged in order from least to most costly.
First, states could adopt laws guaranteeing that forum selection
clauses selecting the business court will be enforced.221 In most
states, forum selection clauses will be enforced in commercial
disputes,222 but a state could dispel any lingering uncertainty by
enacting a statute that explicitly guarantees that the business court
would enforce such clauses. A number of states—including New
York, Illinois, California, and Texas—have already enacted statutes
to this effect for high-value commercial disputes.223 States with
business courts that are interested in attracting litigation business
should follow their lead.
Second, states could create business courts with a nonexclusive
focus on a particular industry, such as technology, or a particular
area of law, such as sales. It is important that this focus be nonex-
clusive because courts that are too narrowly tailored are likely to
exclude more litigation business than they attract. This strategy
could be pursued in coordination with the “superstar” strategy
outlined below in that a state might specifically seek to recruit
individuals who are known experts in the business court’s particular
area of specialty. The fact that such a court exists may well induce
220. See supra Part V.A.
221. Delaware has already done this in its Complex Commercial Litigation Division. See,
e.g., Ingress Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010) (“Forum selection ... clauses are
presumptively valid and should be specifically enforced unless the resisting party ... clearly
show[s] that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for
such reasons as fraud and overreaching.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in State Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 361, 370 (1993) (“State courts
reversed years of hostility to forum selection clauses in purely commercial contracts, relying
on [Supreme Court precedent]. So complete is this evolution that today nearly every state
court that has considered the issue since 1972 has held that purely domestic forum selection
clauses are prima facie valid and enforceable.”).
223. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 2092; supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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parties in a particular industry, or parties negotiating a particular
type of contract, to litigate their disputes in that specific court
rather than elsewhere. Indeed, the existence of such a court may
prompt parties to write forum selection clauses into their contracts,
choosing ex ante to resolve their disputes before that particular
court.
Third, states could seek to hire “superstar” commercial arbitra-
tors—that is, those individuals with a reputation for fairness and
expertise in the field of commercial law—as their business court
judges.224 When one files a lawsuit in most jurisdictions in the
United States, the case is randomly assigned to a particular
judge.225 Until this assignment is made, it is impossible to know
which judge will hear a particular case. To the extent that the
judges in a particular courthouse vary considerably in their levels
of business expertise, one is in effect rolling the dice that the case
will be assigned to a business-savvy judge. By comparison, if there
are only three judges on a particular business court, and if each of
them is renowned for his or her expertise in business law, then one
can be sure that any case filed in that court will be heard by an
expert. In effect, a litigant is getting many of the benefits of arbi-
tration at considerably less cost because the proceedings are being
subsidized by the state. If the three judges who sit on a particular
state’s business court are renowned commercial arbitrators, then it
is plausible that litigants would be more likely to file their suit
there to the exclusion of other jurisdictions.
Fourth, states could take steps to make jury trials optional in
certain business disputes.226 The approach here would be, in effect,
224. In states where the judges are elected, it may be difficult for the state to simply “hire”
a particular person to be a judge. This innovation is therefore more likely to be implemented
in states where judges are appointed. Even in these states, however, there is no guarantee
that the salary paid to a business court judge would be sufficient to persuade a well-known
commercial arbitrator to take the position.
225. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 46 (2009) (noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court recommended randomization of case
assignments as a requirement of state constitutional law to combat perceived “judge-shopping”
by state prosecutors).
226. Some states have experimented with requiring bench trials in commercial disputes.
In 1996, the Milwaukee Circuit Court created a voluntary business track in an attempt to
bring about quick resolution to business disputes. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 275.
The court limited pleadings, provided for expedited discovery, forbade appeals, and—most
notably—required judges, rather than juries, to issue opinions. Id. In 2004, New Jersey
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to flip the default from a jury trial to a bench trial for the types of
cases eligible to be heard by a business court. To the extent that
businesses would more often prefer to litigate complex commercial
matters to a judge rather than a jury, this may attract litigants to
the state while still preserving the ability of the litigants to have a
jury trial if both parties agree. While this proposal would present
problems under virtually every state constitution, which generally
track the language of the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing jury
trials in civil proceedings,227 the difficulty of changing the rule may
well result in a windfall to the first state to make the change.
One may fairly ask, however, why states would be interested in
pursuing any of the above innovations or, indeed, in competing for
litigation business at all. The direct beneficiary of successful com-
petition in this area is not the state, but rather the attorneys who
reside in that state. While states may tax the additional income
earned by the local bar, it is an open question whether these in-
direct benefits would be sufficient to offset the costs of pursuing the
innovations discussed above. Moreover, the state court judges who
have been the primary movers when it comes to creating business
courts may be less enthusiastic about their competitive benefits if
they know that the primary winners of the competition are likely to
be local lawyers rather than the state as a whole.
In light of the foregoing discussion, a possible—indeed, a logical
—reaction to the conclusions outlined above would be to disregard
the potential impact of competition altogether when establishing
business courts. In other words, business court advocates may cease
to argue that these courts should be created in order to attract
regular business, corporate charters, or litigation business to their
adopted a similar program in its chancery courts with the goal of resolving disputes more
quickly. Id. at 174-75. To participate in the program, the parties had to agree to waive a jury
trial, use complementary dispute resolution techniques, and agree to expedited discovery. Id.
While neither of these projects was successful, this does not necessarily mean that commercial
litigants prefer jury trials. In Milwaukee, for example, the fact that no appeal was permitted
from the judgment, among other factors, may have dissuaded parties from using the business
track.
227. Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 544 n.47 (2005)
(“The right to a civil jury is protected in federal courts by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, and in almost all state courts by state constitutions, with two exceptions,
Louisiana and Colorado.”).
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states. The possible implications of such a move are discussed in the
next Part.
VII. ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
In the event that states turn away from the notion that competi-
tive goals should influence the decision of whether to create a
business court, then the case for establishing such courts will rest
primarily on two alternative rationales: (1) that business courts
improve the quality of decisions in business cases, and (2) that
business courts enable a court system to operate more efficiently.228
While a comprehensive evaluation of the merits of each of these
rationales is well beyond the scope of this Article, each is discussed
briefly below.
A. Improved Quality of Decisions
One alternative argument in support of business courts is that,
irrespective of their competitive impact, they render higher-quality
decisions in business cases than do generalist courts.229 The idea is
that a specialized judge who hears only business cases is in a better
position to resolve such disputes quickly and correctly than a gen-
eralist judge who may be unfamiliar with business concepts or,
alternatively, may lack an interest in business law. To the extent
that business court judges publish their decisions, the publication
of more and better-reasoned opinions by these judges also has the
potential to generate greater certainty and predictability in the
fields of corporate and commercial law.230
228. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 11 (arguing that business courts should be evaluated
based, among other factors, on (1) the quality of their decision making, and (2) their efficiency
in managing their dockets); cf. Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious
Tribunals, and the Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231, 250
(2010) (“The current central arguments for specialization concern systematic efficiency and
uniformity.”).
229. See Benjamin F. Tennille, Lee Applebaum & Anne Tucker Nees, Getting to Yes in
Specialized Courts: The Unique Role of ADR in Business Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 35, 43 (2010) (citing improved decision making and case management in individual cases
as a core rationale for creating business courts).
230. The availability of these opinions means that companies will have a better under-
standing of the law ex ante, which may inform how they choose to structure their business
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While it is always difficult to determine whether one court ren-
ders better decisions than another court in particular cases, there
is some empirical support for the notion that business courts do
render more satisfying decisions in business cases.231 Surveys of
attorneys who have appeared before a particular business court tend
to show high levels of satisfaction with these courts.232 In Philadel-
phia, for example, a 2005 survey of attorneys who had been involved
with the business court there found that 97 percent would choose for
a case to be heard by that court if they had a “choice of venue,” and
90 percent of respondents were “very satisfied” with the treatment
they had received from that court.233 In Massachusetts, a 2003
survey of attorneys who had appeared before that state’s business
court found that 88 percent of respondents were “extremely satis-
fied” or “very satisfied” with their experience, and 83 percent be-
lieved that the business court had enabled them to provide better
legal service to their clients.234 In that same Massachusetts survey,
however, only 60 percent of the respondents stated that they were
more likely to recommend that their clients use the business court
to resolve disputes instead of using private dispute resolution
dealings, and will be able to predict more accurately whether they are likely to prevail in a
lawsuit ex post, which may promote settlement. See id. at 41-42 (discussing the value of
predictability in business law and noting that the publication of well-reasoned opinions
contributes to increased predictability); cf. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The
Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2006) (observing with respect
to contract boilerplate that “an interpreted clause is a valuable, predictable clause”). 
231. Rochelle Dreyfuss has defined “quality” of decision making in this context to
encompass three concepts: accuracy (correctness), precision (reproducibility of results), and
coherence. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 12-13.
232. See, e.g., COMM. OF SEVENTY, STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PHILADELPHIA COMMERCE
PROGRAM 25, 27 (2005) [hereinafter PHILADELPHIA REPORT], available at http://apps.
americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL150011pub/materials/reports/Committeeof70.pdf. To
be sure, surveys reporting that attorneys were pleased with the relative performance of a
business court do not provide direct support for the notion that such courts render better
decisions; it may be that these courts render decisions more likely to favor a particular
attorney’s client. To the extent that most disputes that make their way before a business court
are business-to-business disputes, however, most of the attorneys surveyed were probably
representing business interests. As such, the likelihood that their positive responses indicate
pro-business bias, as opposed to quality, is low.
233. Id.
234. BUS. LITIG. SESSION RES. COMM., THE BUSINESS LITIGATION SESSION IN
MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT: A STATUS REPORT 2 (2003) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS
REPORT], available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL150011pub/
materials/reports/2003MassachusettsReport.pdf (reporting positive survey results).
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services such as arbitration or mediation.235 This suggests that
arbitration will continue to play an important role in resolving
commercial disputes in Massachusetts, the business court notwith-
standing.
There is also some anecdotal evidence suggesting that business
courts are better than their generalist counterparts at resolving
business disputes. The Association of Corporate Counsel, a trade
group for in-house lawyers, has taken the position that the use of
business courts results in an “improvement in the quality of
dispositions” in business litigation.236 And individual attorneys who
have litigated before business courts have stated that such courts
render higher quality decisions in business cases and that business
court judges manage business cases more effectively than do their
generalist counterparts.237
While the above evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that
business courts have the capacity to render high quality decisions
in business cases and that the business courts in Massachusetts and
Philadelphia have, in fact, rendered a number of high quality
decisions. However, two caveats are in order. First, the fact that a
particular business court is well respected among attorneys that
have appeared before it does not mean that all business courts enjoy
similar levels of support. A survey of South Carolina attorneys who
had appeared before that state’s business court found that only 51
percent of respondents had a “positive” business court experience,
while 48 percent had a “neutral” or “negative” experience.238 The
perceived performance of these courts will, inevitably, depend on the
quality of the individuals selected to preside over them and on the
235. Id.
236. Press Release, Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Statement on Business Courts (Oct. 18,
2009), available at http://www.acc.com/advocacy/upload/ACC-Statement-on-Business-Courts
101809.pdf.
237. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 165 n.129 (citing interview with Chicago
litigator for proposition that the business court in Illinois generates “more expeditious and
fair results”); Tennille, Applebaum & Nees, supra note 229, at 43 (citing improved case
management in individual cases as a core rationale for creating business courts).
238. PILOT PROGRAM EVALUATION COMM., REPORT ON SOUTH CAROLINA’S BUSINESS COURT
PILOT PROGRAM 7 (2009) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA REPORT], available at http://apps.
americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL150011pub/materials/reports/SouthCarolinaBusiness
CourtReport2009.pdf.
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level of resources devoted to facilitating their success.239 The survey
results above suggest only that business courts have the capacity to
render high-quality decisions, not that they will necessarily do so.
The second caveat relates to the source of a business court’s
comparative advantage. It is often said that “specialization” ac-
counts for the ability of a business court to render quality decisions
in business cases.240 The use of this term implies that all business
court judges are experts in corporate and commercial law, but this
is not always the case. Business court judges are typically drawn
from an existing pool of trial court judges in a particular state.241
Although a judge who volunteers to serve on a business court is
likely to have had more experience in the field of commercial liti-
gation than one who does not, the degree of expertise that a given
judge has in the fields of corporate and commercial law will vary
widely.242 
A business court judge is, however, unquestionably a specialist
in the facts and prior history of a particular case. One of the core
attributes of a business court is that each case is assigned to a
single judge from start to finish.243 To the extent that a judge who
is familiar with the prior facts and proceedings in a complex
239. See John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 45, 47 (1995) (“[C]ourts are successful because the judges in those courts are selected
and appointed by a process that selects high-quality jurists more often than not.”).
240. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 2, 16. One must be careful not to associate greater
specialization with higher quality. A number of scholars have argued, for example, that giving
the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals has actually reduced the overall
quality of the decisions in this area. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620-22 (2007). Similarly,
Richard Posner has stated a number of reasons why generalist judges are to be preferred to
specialists. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 779-
88 (1983).
241. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 234, at 4, 8 (describing the use of
current judges in both New York and Massachusetts).
242. As judges hear more and more business cases, they will doubtless develop subject
matter expertise. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of
Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1538 (2010) (“Whether or not judges on a specialized
court have prior experience in the field of their court's work, they become specialists once they
begin their judicial service.”). And, as noted previously, some states provide additional
training to business court judges to deepen their knowledge of business law. See supra note
208. At the outset of their tenure, however, it cannot be said that all business court judges are
experts in the fields of corporate and commercial law.
243. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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business dispute is a specialist in that case, this comparative
advantage may enable the judge to render a better decision than one
who was unfamiliar with these matters, irrespective of that judge’s
substantive knowledge of corporate or commercial law. In the
Massachusetts survey, attorneys cited the “assignment of one judge
throughout the case” as one of the keys to the business court en-
abling them to provide better service to their clients.244 This con-
clusion was echoed by attorneys in a similar survey conducted in
South Carolina.245 Thus, to the extent that business courts are
perceived to be rendering better decisions than generalist courts, it
may be that this improvement in quality derives from specialization
in the facts of their particular case rather than specialization in any
particular subject matter.
B. Enhanced Administrative Efficiency
The second alternative argument in support of business courts
relates to administrative efficiency.246 On this account, the assign-
ment of one or more existing trial judges to a specialized business
docket will result in the more efficient resolution of business cases
and nonbusiness cases alike.247 Business cases will be resolved
expeditiously by a specialist judge with an active interest in busi-
ness law.248 Nonbusiness cases, in turn, will be resolved more
quickly because they will no longer be forced to compete for docket
space with business cases.249 Some commentators have even argued
244. MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 234, at 2.
245. SOUTH CAROLINA REPORT, supra note 238, at 7 tbl.D.
246. While it is difficult to precisely measure the “efficiency” of a particular court or court
system, factors that should inform this undertaking include (1) the speed with which cases
are decided, (2) the number of judge-hours required to handle the docket, and (3) the number
of cases and issues generated by the judicial system itself. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 14.
247. See Applebaum, supra note 87, at 16 (observing that business courts “have garnered
respect ... for their ... internal efficiencies, as well as because of the belief that taking business
and commercial cases off of the general docket allows other kinds of cases to move more
efficiently as well”).
248. See Balotti & Brandel, supra note 44, at 26 (noting the efficiency gains derived from
having a single expert judge “handle every aspect of cases from motion practice, to settlement
conferences, to responding to in-court requests of counsel, to making the ultimate decision”).
249. See id. (“The more efficient handling of disputes by judges who understand the
complex economics and legal principles that apply to commerce will free up judicial resources
for other litigants.”); Robert L. Haig, New York Creates Business Courts, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-
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that the strategic reassignment of generalist judges to specialist
roles could have an effect equivalent to hiring a new full-time
judge.250
Let us first consider the claim that business courts make it
possible to resolve business cases more efficiently. There is statisti-
cal support for this claim, but it derives almost exclusively from the
experiences of a single state: New York. In that state, the creation
of a business court apparently led to significant improvements in
the average disposition rate in contract cases.251 Outside of New
York, however, there is virtually no published statistical evi-
dence—or any definitive statements by state officials with access to
internal court data—that the creation of business courts results in
the more efficient resolution of business cases. This proposition,
whenever it is made, is supported by reference to New York
statistics or, alternatively, to anecdotal evidence from practicing
attorneys.252 To date, no other state has published any sort of report
citing to state-specific data to show that the creation of a particular
business court led to more efficient resolution of business cases.253
Significantly, although at least four states have conducted a formal
review of their respective business court’s performance after a
period of years, none of these reviews cited any statistics to support
Oct. 1996, at 33, 35 (“The Commercial Division would ease pressure on an overcrowded court
system. Removing complex commercial cases from other parts of the state supreme court
would allow those parts to function more efficiently and would reduce the possibility that a
few complicated commercial cases would displace the time and attention that many other
pending cases should receive.”).
250. ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient
Judiciary, 52 BUS. L. 947, 952 (1997) (“[W]ith the same resources, the work of more than four
generalist judges can be accomplished by three specialized business judges.”); Balotti &
Brandel, supra note 44, at 26 (“Four specialized judges assigned as members of a business
court division, for example, who can handle the work of five nonspecialized judges hearing
similar cases, have for all practical purposes added the equivalent of a new full-time judge to
an otherwise beleaguered system.”). 
251. See Bach & Applebaum, supra note 13, at 154.
252. In Philadelphia, the survey respondents believed that the business court resulted in
faster and more efficient resolution of cases, but the survey cited no statistics from the court
to confirm that this belief was correct. See PHILADELPHIA REPORT, supra note 232, at 1 (“96%
of the [survey] respondents believed that the [business court] had improved the time to
dispose of commercial cases and 84% thought that the [business court] handled cases
efficiently.”).
253. This near absence of data means that it is impossible to evaluate the efficiency of
business courts under any of the criteria discussed in note 247.
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the claim that the creation of these courts led to speedier disposition
of business cases.254
Let us turn next to the claim that business courts make it pos-
sible to resolve nonbusiness cases more efficiently. There is, to date,
no statistical support for this claim.255 As of the time of this writing,
no state has published any report that purports to evaluate the
system-wide impact of a business court on the functioning of the
state’s overall judicial system.256 Surveys showing high levels of
satisfaction among attorneys who appear before a business court or
statistics showing improvements in the average disposition rates for
business cases in the New York Commercial Division tell us nothing
about what is happening to other nonbusiness cases in the state’s
court system.257 If these other cases are being processed more slowly
because of the diversion of judicial resources to the business court,
then these costs must be weighed against the benefits generated by
that court. As Anne Tucker Nees has written, “The question that
critics raise is whether specialized courts for complex civil cases
254. See CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.C. BUS. COURT, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION 21 (2004) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA REPORT], available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL150011pub/materials/reports/North
CarolinaReport(2004).pdf; MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 234, at 27; PHILADELPHIA
REPORT, supra note 232, at 46; SOUTH CAROLINA REPORT, supra note 238, at 30 fig.2.
255. This claim is routinely made without citing to statistics. See, e.g., Bach & Applebaum,
supra note 13, at 182 (noting the unsupported claim by the Co-Chair of the Massachusetts
Business Litigation Resource Committee that “[t]he case load that other [Superior Court]
sessions would have had has been significantly reduced because the cases that go to the
Business Litigation Session [in Massachusetts] do not go to the other regular sessions of the
court”).
256. See MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 234, at 5-6 (responding to concerns about
inequitable distribution of judicial resources by citing competitive pressures from arbitration,
need for business case law, efficiency gains in the abstract, and the existence of other
specialized courts, but citing no statistics); NORTH CAROLINA REPORT, supra note 254, at 21
(citing anecdotal evidence that the transfer of two superior court judges to the business court
will improve administrative efficiency, but providing no numbers in support of this claim);
PHILADELPHIA REPORT, supra note 232, at 46 (noting anecdotal survey responses to conclude
that business court had made the broader court system more efficient, but without citing any
statistics). 
257. All of the data from New York, moreover, dates to 1997. See Bach & Applebaum, supra
note 13, at 154. As of 2011, New York did not possess a comprehensive list of all of the
opinions published by the ten commercial divisions statewide in a given year, although
summaries of “leading” opinions from the Commercial Division are published in the
Commercial Division Law Report. See Commercial Division Law Report, N.Y. ST. SUP. CT.
COMM. DIV., http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/lawreport.shtml (last visited Mar. 28,
2012).
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create two justice systems: one with the best judges, expeditious
resolution, expert attention, and other resources and the other with
general judges, longer resolution time, less resources, and a greater
risk of inconsistent results.”258 In order to fully validate the claim
that these courts enhance administrative efficiency, in other words,
it is necessary to show that cases across the entire judicial system
—not just cases that come before the business court—are being
resolved at least as efficiently as they were before the judges were
reassigned to hear business cases.259 To date, this proposition is still
untested.
Accordingly, states would be well advised to publish any statistics
tending to show that business courts result in more efficient dis-
position of business or nonbusiness cases. If a particular business
court has successfully brought about significant improvements in
judicial efficiency, then this finding should be widely publicized. In
addition, states should adopt reforms that would allow them to
evaluate case loads and disposition rates by case type before a
business court is established to facilitate the evaluation of whether,
in fact, the court is successful in improving these metrics after it
comes into being. This information is essential if one is to determine
whether business courts do, in fact, bring about gains in administra-
tive efficiency, regardless of case type.
The lack of published data to date does not mean that business
courts do not enable court systems to resolve business and nonbusi-
ness cases more quickly and efficiently. It does mean, however, that
there is currently a mismatch between the confident assertions by
business court advocates that these innovations enhance judicial
efficiency and the lack of any statistical data outside of New York
258. Nees, supra note 1, at 493. Nonbusiness cases could be processed more slowly for any
number of reasons, ranging from inefficiencies in the master calendar system to the
assignment of the most efficient judges to the business court.
259. To be sure, the absence of evidence relating to efficiency gains in those states that
have established business courts does not show that such gains have not occurred. And there
can be no question that measuring such gains across an institution as complex as a state’s
court system is difficult. See PHILADELPHIA REPORT, supra note 232, at 46 (identifying
challenges in measuring efficiency of court system); Arie Y. Lewin, Richard C. Morey &
Thomas J. Cook, Evaluating the Administrative Efficiencies of Court, 10 OMEGA 401, 405 tbl.1
(1982) (listing twelve factors to be considered in evaluating the efficiency of a court system).
Still, it is noteworthy that this particular claim is supported almost exclusively by anecdotal
evidence almost two decades into the business court project.
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suggesting that this is so. Until more and better data is made
available, it is difficult—if not impossible—to determine the actual
impact of a business court on the administrative efficiency of any
particular court system.
CONCLUSION
As states have moved to establish business courts over the past
two decades, advocates for these courts have advanced a number of
rationales justifying their creation. This Article examined one
particular set of rationales—those relating to the claim that
business courts will enable states to compete more successfully for
economic resources—and found them to be generally unpersuasive.
It argued that business courts are unlikely to attract business to a
jurisdiction under any circumstances and are unlikely, as currently
comprised, to attract incorporation business. It also suggested that
while these courts can attract—and have attracted—litigation
business to the jurisdiction that creates them, there are limits on
the potential scope of such diversion.
The Article then applied these insights to two related issues. The
first is institutional design. In light of the above conclusions, states
should (1) avoid creating business and technology courts with the
goal of attracting business; (2) fundamentally rethink the way busi-
ness courts are designed if the goal is to compete for corporate
charters; and (3) undertake a number of additional reforms if the
goal is to attract litigation business. The second issue is the viability
of alternative rationales. If the above conclusions lead states to dis-
regard competition-based rationales for creating business courts,
then it becomes even more important to find robust support for the
notion, first, that business courts result in higher quality decisions
and, second, that business courts enhance administrative efficiency
within a court system. While there is some evidence for the propo-
sition that business courts render better decisions in business cases,
there is a lack of published statistical evidence to support the
proposition that such courts enhance the overall administrative
efficiency of court systems.
